

A CONCEPTUALIZATION AND EMPIRICAL TEST OF
AN IDENTITY-REGULATION MODEL OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS

BY

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An identity-regulation model of self-consciousness was proposed, claiming that actors who lack the confidence and/or ability to present a desired view of themselves (to self or others) attend more to those acts or behaviors necessary for successful self-presentations. Thus, compared to less self-attentive actors, those who reported being very self-attentive were expected to a) score higher on measures assessing low self-presentation confidence, b) report being less able to convey desired impressions of themselves to audiences, and c) perceive discrepancies between how they view themselves and both how they believe they can and should be and how they believe others perceive them.

Based on public and private self-consciousness scores obtained during pretesting, 127 extreme scorers were recruited (34 scoring high on the public and low on the private subscale, 30 scoring low on the public and high on the private subscale, and 32 scoring high and 31 scoring low on both subscales). Subjects, accompanied by a same-sex

friend, completed a questionnaire designed to assess self-presentation confidence (i.e., fear on negative evaluation, social anxiety) and ability (i.e., interpersonal control, personal efficacy, self-monitoring, and academic and achievement causal attributions). Friends also rated subjects on these dimensions. Finally, subjects described their actual, desired, and perceived selves, and friends provided a description of subjects.

Moderate support for the model was obtained. Compared to their low counterparts, high public self-conscious actors reported a) less self-presentation confidence and b) engaging in both facilitative and debilitative self-presentation behavior. Also self-views of these individuals differed from their friends' descriptions of them. In contrast, high private self-conscious subjects reported lower self-presentation ability but offered more accurate perceived self descriptions, compared to low counterparts. Regarding self-discrepancy, for social-identity relevant traits low public self-conscious actors exhibited smaller discrepancies between their actual and perceived selves compared to discrepancies between their a) actual and desired selves and b) desired and perceived selves. Finally, friends' public self-consciousness scores resembled those of subjects. These results are discussed in terms of their implications for the proposed model.

CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION

A Brief Historical Perspective

The act of holding one's self as an object of attention has been discussed by many theorists over the course of the century (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1990; Cooley, 1922; Duval & Wicklund, 1972; James, 1890; Mead, 1934; Wicklund, 1975). However, the last 20 years have witnessed a flurry of theory and research devoted to the understanding of self-attention. For example, the role of self-focus has been included in theories of self-concept differences (Franzoi, 1983; Turner, 1978; Turner, Scheier, Carver, & Ickes, 1978), behavior regulation (Carver & Scheier, 1990; Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Gibbons, 1990; Wicklund & Frey, 1980), emotional experience and expression (Hansen, Hansen, & Crano, 1989; Pyszczynski, Holt, & Greenberg, 1987; Scheier & Carver, 1977), and self-presentation (Baumeister & Tice, 1986; Schlenker, 1980, 1985; Schlenker & Weigold, 1990; Solomon & Schopler, 1982).

Along the way, our understanding of the nature of self-attention has evolved considerably. For example, researchers have investigated both the situational factors that might lead an actor to become self-attentive and possible individual differences in the tendency to focus

attention on the self (Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Carver & Scheier, 1981). For the sake of clarity, situationally induced self-attention is typically referred to as self-awareness, whereas the chronic tendency to be self-attentive is called self-consciousness (Carver & Scheier, 1981).

In an attempt to measure individual differences in self-consciousness, Fenigstein, Scheier, and Buss (1975) devised the Self-Consciousness Scale, which, although expected to yield a single construct, actually measures three constructs: private self-consciousness, public self-consciousness, and social anxiety. Private self-consciousness refers to the extent to which individuals monitor their internal states, moods, and thoughts. Public self-consciousness is an actor's tendency to focus on himself as a social object, attending to such aspects of self as style, appearance, and others' impressions. Social anxiety refers to discomfort associated with group interaction and is not considered to be a facet of self-consciousness (Buss, 1980; Carver & Scheier, 1981; Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975).

In considering the cause(s) of self-attention, several theorists have proposed models that emphasize its role in behavior regulation (Carver & Scheier, 1990; Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Gibbons, 1990; Wicklund & Frey, 1980; Wicklund, 1975). For example, Duval and Wicklund (1972)

claim that situationally induced self-attention leads actors to become cognizant of the way in which their behavior falls short of ideal standards. When unable to avoid being self-focused, such individuals become motivated to reduce the salient discrepancies by matching their behavior to relevant standards. Similarly, in their Cybernetic model of behavior regulation, Carver and Scheier (1990) argue that when situations evoke a particular goal, self-directed attention enables the actor to assess his behavioral position in relation to the goal, as well as the rate in which potential behavior-goal discrepancies are reduced. Although these views provide insight into the nature of self-attention in general, they fail to address the factors related to very high or low levels of chronic self-attention. To address this issue, an identity-regulation model of self-consciousness is presented.

An Identity-Regulation Model of Self-Consciousness

The present model proposes that self-consciousness may be viewed as the self-directed attention accompanying actors' attempts to control how they are viewed by audiences (i.e., self, real, or imagined others). When actors believe that they are failing (or have failed) to establish a desirable view of self, they should become self-focused. By directing attention toward the self, actors are better able to access self-relevant information, convey the desired impression, and generally defend against

threats to identity. However, when people believe that their view of self is shared by the audience, they should spend relatively less time attending to how they access and convey self-relevant information.

Based on this reasoning, persons who report being highly self-conscious should describe themselves (i.e., actual self) in ways that differ from how they think they can and should be (desired self) as well as from how they believe others view them (i.e., perceived self). Public self-conscious individuals, who report focusing on overt, observable aspects of self (and not to private, covert aspects), should exhibit self-discrepancies between how they would like to be seen and how they believe others view them, especially concerning socially negotiated identity-images. Private self-conscious persons, who report attending to unobservable aspects of self rather than observable ones, should exhibit self-discrepancies between how they view themselves and how they believe they can and should be, with personal identity-images most likely implicated. Finally, those who indicate that they seldom focus attention on themselves should offer self-descriptions that are consistent with how they think they can and should be and with how they believe others view them. These predictions, which will be elaborated shortly, were tested in the present study.

The model also suggests several potential reasons that an actor might have discrepant self-views. If an actor lacks either the confidence or ability necessary to establish a desirable view of herself, she would be more likely to regard her presentations of self as lacking (leading to an increase in attention to such presentations). This type of behavior would be analogous to the novice pianist who attends to the specific movements of her fingers when performing during a recital (e.g., Vallacher & Wegner, 1985, 1987). In order to test this possibility, measures of general social confidence and skill were obtained from individuals differing in self-consciousness. It was predicted that, compared to non-self-reflective persons, those high in self-consciousness would exhibit lower scores on both types of measures.

Finally, the model recognizes that, for a variety of reasons, a person might experience low social confidence and report being socially unskilled despite being generally successful in establishing a desirable view of self. Similarly, an actor who feels confident and skilled in social situations may, in fact, be viewed differently by those around her. To examine this possibility, the study obtained descriptions of subjects provided by their friends. If biased perceptions account for confidence and skill differences, subjects should be described by others in ways that differ from how they think they are perceived.

It should be noted that the present study represents an attempt to test a series of hypotheses derived from a reconceptualization of some of the antecedents and implications of self-consciousness. These hypotheses concern self-discrepancy, identity-discrepancy, and general self-presentation confidence and ability and therefore will be discussed in detail. Related assumptions, concepts, and hypotheses are included so that a more complete presentation of the model may be considered. For example, the present model attempts to account for identity patterns related to self-consciousness. Also, additional reasons that actors might differ in the degree to which discrepancies (are perceived to) exist between their self-views are considered. Finally, the model considers how self-attention, self-presentation, and identity may influence one another, thus becoming reciprocally determined. These ideas are speculative in nature, were not tested in the present study, and should be considered with an eye toward future research. Before considering the model in detail, relevant theories and research will be discussed.

CHAPTER II LITERATURE REVIEW

Reflexivity and Related Concepts

For present purposes, three pervasive, interrelated topics guiding research on self-attention will be explored. The first is a consideration of William James' (1890) view on the nature of the self and consciousness. The second topic examines current theories of self-attention that may be viewed as being grounded in Jamesian ideas (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1981, 1985; Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975; Wicklund, 1975). This discussion will incorporate the views of theorists who speak to the nature of public and private domains of self (Baumeister & Tice, 1986; Buss, 1980; Carver & Scheier, 1981; Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975; Schlenker, 1980, 1985). The final topic is an exploration of the relationship between self-attention, identity, and related thoughts, emotions, and behavior (Doherty & Schlenker, 1991; Greenwald & Breckler, 1985; Higgins, 1987, 1989; Hogan & Cheek, 1983; Schlenker, 1980, 1985; Schlenker & Pennington, 1993; Schlenker & Weigold, 1990, 1992).

William James

One of the first major treatments of reflexivity and the self was provided by William James. In The Principles of Psychology, James (1890) proposed that the self is composed of two separate parts: the "self-as-knower" and the "self-as-known." The former, also known as the "pure ego" or "I," refers to that part of self that is embedded within the stream of consciousness; it is that part of self whose existence cannot be known directly but must be inferred from our ability to know and do things. The self-as-knower is the "self as experiencer," guiding our attention, thoughts, and behavior as well as providing us with a sense of continuity and unity.

Alternatively, the self-as-known, also referred to as the empirical self or "Me," is the self as object of attention and knowledge. When people shift their attention inward, in order to understand, evaluate, or describe themselves, it is the self-as-known that is the object of attention (James, 1890). James considered the empirical self to be multifaceted, proposing three separate components: the material self, the spiritual self, and the social self. The material self is composed of those physical aspects of a person that might be considered part of her--tangible things such as her house, possessions, and body. The spiritual self reflects one's temperament and abilities, as well as thoughts and feelings concerning such

matters as God, fate, the universe, and one's inner or private life. The social self consists of the evaluations, impressions, and recognition one receives from others whose opinions are valued (James, 1890).

James' ideas have had considerable impact on the direction of current research and theory regarding self-attention. His distinction between the self-as-knower and the self-as-known is represented in Duval and Wicklund's (1972) distinction between subjective and objective self-awareness. In addition, James' spiritual and social selves have been considered forerunners to present day distinctions between public and private selves (Carver & Scheier, 1987; Fenigstein, 1987; but see Tetlock & Manstead, 1985; Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1987).

Duval and Wicklund

Duval and Wicklund (1972) propose two basic states of consciousness: subjective self-awareness and objective self-awareness. According to these authors, when in a state of subjective self-awareness, individuals direct their attention outward on the external world as object. When in this state, where the self is the subject rather than the object of thought, an actor has no access to the contents of her self and therefore may be viewed as non-self-aware. However, once an actor begins to direct her attention inward, on the self-as-object, she ceases to be subjectively self-aware and becomes objectively self-aware.

According to the authors, people in this latter state become cognizant of the extent to which their conduct or performance meets (or fails to meet) relevant ideal social standards, resulting in at least two consequences (Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Wicklund, 1975). First, objective self-awareness motivates people to match their behavior to existing norms or standards. Second, because such standards are ideal in nature, there usually exists some discrepancy between conduct and standards. Because objective self-awareness makes such discrepancies salient, it is usually an aversive state that actors seek to avoid (Duval & Wicklund, 1972). In subsequent writings, Wicklund (1975) has recognized that occasions do exist where individuals meet or even exceed relevant performance standards. In such situations, attention directed toward the self should not lead to negative affect and may even produce positive emotions.

Fenigstein, Scheier, and Buss

Tests of Duval and Wicklund's theory have identified various situational factors that increase self-attention, including the presence of mirrors, video-cameras, tape recorders, and audiences (Carver, 1974; Carver & Scheier, 1980, 1981; Duval & Wicklund, 1972). Subsequent work in the area examined the chronic tendency to focus on the self. In an attempt to measure individual differences in chronic self-attention, Fenigstein, Scheier, and Buss

(1975) devised the Self-Consciousness Scale, which is composed of three subscales.

The first, the private self-consciousness subscale, consists of items that measure the tendency to monitor internal moods, thoughts, and motives. This subscale contains such statements as "I'm always trying to figure myself out," "I'm generally attentive to my inner feelings," and "I reflect about myself a lot." In general, when individuals attend to internal, covert aspects of self, they are said to be privately self-conscious. The second, the public self-consciousness subscale, measures the tendency to focus on overt, observable aspects of oneself, such as appearance and others' impressions. Statements contained in this subscale include "I'm very concerned about the way I present myself," "I usually worry about making a good impression," and "one of the last things I do when I leave the house is look in the mirror" (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975). For the sake of brevity, the terms "privately self-conscious individuals" or "privates" will be used when referring to those who report focusing on private aspects of self at the exclusion of public aspects. Similarly, the terms "publicly self-conscious individuals" or "publics" will be used when referring to those who report focusing on public aspects of self at the exclusion of private aspects.

Research examining the validity of the Self-Consciousness Scale has directed most of its attention on privates and publics. For example, privately self-conscious persons have been found to behave in ways that are consistent with their private attitudes (Scheier, Buss, & Buss, 1978) and are less influenced by group conformity pressures (Froming & Carver, 1981). Also, privately self-conscious individuals tend to be perceived by others in ways that match how they describe themselves (Franzoi, 1983; Underwood & Moore, 1981), especially when such individuals possess good self-expressive abilities (Cheek, 1982) or when observers spend a longer period of time watching them (Bernstein & Davis, 1982). Characterizations of privates include such descriptions as autonomous, independent, self-directed, authentic, expressive, and relatively insensitive to social demands (Buss, 1980; Carver & Scheier, 1985; Fenigstein, 1987).

In contrast, publicly self-conscious people have been described as malleable impression managers who are (a) concerned about their personal appearance (Miller & Cox, 1982), (b) susceptible to pressures to conform (Froming & Carver, 1981; Scheier, 1980), (c) highly sensitive to others' opinions and impressions of them (Fenigstein, 1979) and (d) less accurately perceived by others (Bernstein & Davis, 1982). In short, publics have been characterized as

individuals who are interested in getting along by going along, even if that requires misrepresenting themselves.

The Unexamined Majority

Despite the attention given to publics and privates, relatively little is known about the other two groups generated from a median split methodology, namely those who report frequently focusing on both public and private aspects of themselves and those who report that they seldom focus on either of these aspects. Because the public and privates self-consciousness subscales are positively correlated (r 's ranging from .20 to .47) (Carver & Scheier, 1985; Cheek & Briggs, 1982; Fenigstein et al., 1975; Schlenker & Pennington, 1993; Schlenker & Weigold, 1990), greater than half of all subjects in such studies fall into these two groups. Thus, with regard to self-consciousness, there appears to be a dearth of information about a large segment of the population. Although many questions regarding these groups exist, the present study confined its focus to an examination of factors believed to surround high and low levels of self-attention. As a starting point to this examination, we will consider two possible characterizations of self-consciousness, beginning with relevant theory provided by Robert Hogan and Jonathan Cheek.

Hogan and Cheek

Identity is the construct that defines who or what an individual is (Cheek & Briggs, 1982; Schlenker, 1985). The various elements that compose one's identity may be thought of as falling into at least one of two general categories--social and personal (also referred to as public and private) (Buss, 1980; Cheek & Briggs, 1982; Cheek, 1989; Hogan & Cheek, 1983; Miller, 1963; for related views, see Baumeister & Tice, 1986; Schlenker, 1986). Social identity is believed to reflect the various roles of an actor, as well as his reputation, status, and group membership. Personal identity reflects various private self-conceptions and feelings of uniqueness and continuity (Cheek & Briggs, 1982).

In their theory of identity development, Hogan and Cheek (1983) provide a possible explanation as to why individuals differ in the value or importance they place on social and personal aspects of their identity. According to these authors, there are at least two major groups of individuals with whom one might identify when growing up--parents and peers. Based on the possible identification patterns, four prototypical identity (or personality) types emerge.

According to Hogan and Cheek (1983), those who tended to identify with their parents (and childhood roles) as they were growing up would be most likely to be secure in

their values, inner directed, and somewhat asocial. Such individuals would construct their sense of self from private, internal resources, and hence place greater value on their personal identity. In contrast, those who more closely identified with peers (and roles played during school years) should be outgoing and social, if somewhat superficial in their interpersonal relations. Being sensitive to current fads and social expectations, such individuals would value more deeply their social identities (Hogan & Cheek, 1983).

Those who had learned to balance their associations with parental and peer figures would be most likely to value both personal and social identities. Hogan and Cheek (1983) suggest that such individuals may be described as mature and flexible, inner and outer-oriented, principled, and socially sensitive. But what of those who, while growing up, identified with neither their parents nor their peers? These persons would place little importance on their personal and social identities and thus would be truly alienated, holding idiosyncratic values and beliefs unrelated to their own internal standards and to the values of society (Hogan & Cheek, 1983).

Before considering these ideas with regard to self-consciousness, it should be noted that Hogan and Cheek's ideas stem from their consideration of the benefits and drawbacks that might accompany a heavy emphasis on one

aspect of identity over the other; they do not propose to speak to the nature of self-consciousness. However, based on previous research, it seems quite reasonable to associate identity with self-consciousness. Researchers have found that individuals who value social aspects of their identity (e.g., popularity and attractiveness, group memberships) score higher on the public self-consciousness subscale compared to those who place less importance on such aspects (Cheek & Briggs, 1982; Cutler, Lennox, & Wolfe, 1984; Hogan and Cheek, 1983; Penner & Wymer, 1983; Schlenker & Weigold, 1990). Further, this research finds a positive relationship between the importance placed on personal aspects of identity (e.g., emotions and feelings, intellectual ability) and private self-consciousness scores (Cheek & Briggs, 1982; Schlenker & Weigold, 1990).

Hogan and Cheek's analysis also seems reasonable when considering the pattern of responses that would lead one to score high or low on both subscales of the Self-Consciousness Scale. For example, someone who is high in both public and private self-consciousness would endorse as self-characteristic such statements as "I reflect about myself a lot" and "I'm generally attentive to my inner feelings," as well as "I'm concerned about what other people think of me" and "I'm usually aware of my appearance." Actors who offer this type of response pattern appear to be concerned with balancing their inner

convictions with the expectations of others. In contrast, someone low in both public and private self-consciousness would endorse such statements as "I'm not very aware of myself" and "I never think of why I do what I do" and would reject such statements as "I usually worry about making a good impression" and "I'm concerned about what other people think of me." This type of response pattern suggests that the respondent is insensitive to both the expectations of others and his own internal states and motives.

From this discussion, one would expect high levels of self-attention to be associated with positive psychological and emotional indices. Balancing both aspects of identity, self-attentive actors should be quite successful at conveying an image of themselves that matches their private view of themselves. In contrast, those who infrequently focus on themselves would be expected to exhibit negative psychological and emotional states. Such "self-oblivious" actors would be disconnected from their social environment and would lack a coherent sense of self, making it difficult for them to convey successfully to others what they are like.

This characterization of self-consciousness may be contrasted with the views of Duval and Wicklund (1972), who argue that being self-aware is normally an aversive state that highlights one's failure to match ideal standards for conduct. From this perspective, chronic self-focus, as

indicated by high scores on both subscales of the self-consciousness scale, would be associated with negative psychological states. Self-focused actors would be highly cognizant of any discrepancies existing between how they see themselves and how they are viewed by others. Failures to meet personal goals or standards would also be salient, leading the actor to see himself in ways other than how he ultimately would like to be. Far from indicating flexibility and psychological adjustment, a heightened degree of attention to both public and private aspects of self would foster feeling of anxiety and self-criticism. Being less self-attentive would be an asset. Individuals who spend relatively little time focusing attention on themselves would be less likely to notice conflicts between their conduct and relevant personal or social standards. In comparison to their self-focused counterparts, such individuals generally would be more comfortable with themselves and confident in their abilities. A recent examination of identities associated with self-consciousness lends support to this latter view (Schlenker & Pennington, 1993).

Schlenker and Pennington

Employing several different methods, a study conducted by Schlenker and Pennington (1993) asked extreme scorers of the Self-Consciousness Scale to describe themselves. Specifically, four groups of subjects were included: (1)

those who scored in the upper 25th percentile on both public and private self-consciousness, (2) those who scored in the lower 25th percentile on both self-consciousness dimensions, (3) those who scored high on the private and low on the public self-consciousness subscales and (4) those who scored low on the private and high on the public self-consciousness subscales. As part of the experiment, subjects were asked to rate themselves on various personality traits and to respond to potentially self-descriptive statements. These traits and statements were chosen to assess characteristics such as sociability, other-dependence, alienation, self-awareness, spontaneity, trust, anxiety, activeness, and maturity.

Results from the trait/statement rating procedure indicated that, compared to subjects low in public self-consciousness, publicly self-conscious subjects described themselves as more conforming and anxious and less spontaneous. There was also a main effect of private self-consciousness, such that high scorers rated themselves more positively (i.e., warm, considerate, sensitive, introspective) than did low scorers (Schlenker & Pennington, 1993). Several other dimensions (e.g., trusting, decisive, alienated, activity-level) showed no effect of self-consciousness.

A separate task of the study asked subjects to choose 10 trait adjectives (of 45) that they felt best described

themselves. The trait adjectives were chosen to reflect the same dimensions assessed in the rating section. Although general effects of public and private self-consciousness were found in this section, asking subjects to choose a finite number of traits generated a "profile" consisting of trait adjectives most reflective of each of the four groups. The trait adjectives and endorsement rates are shown in Table 1.

A large percentage (71%) of subjects who reported focusing on both public and private aspects of themselves endorsed the trait adjective "self-conscious" as self-descriptive. A significantly smaller percentage of subjects from the other four groups endorsed this trait adjective (32% of public, 17% of private, and 25% of subjects scoring low on both subscales). In addition, only 5% of those who reported being very self-focused endorsed the trait adjective "authentic." Although this term was not one of the most popular ones, approximately one-quarter of public self-conscious and private self-conscious subjects and one-third of subjects scoring low on both subscales chose the trait adjective. In general, the unique self-descriptors of highly self-conscious subjects appeared to be negative.

In contrast, a significantly larger percentage (65%) of subjects who scored low on both subscales endorsed "self-confident," compared to 14% of public self-conscious

Table 1. Trait adjective endorsement rate as a function of public and private self-consciousness.

Private SC	Public Self-Consciousness			
	High		Low	
	<u>High</u>	<u>Low</u>	<u>High</u>	<u>Low</u>
Trait Adjective				
Self-conscious	71 a	32 b	17 b	25 b
Self-critical	57 a	59 a	22 b	30 ab
Authentic	05 b	32 a	22 b	25 ab
Independent	33 b	32 b	56 ab	75 a
Self-confident	0 c	14 c	39 b	65 a
Outgoing	29 ab	36 ab	22 b	55 a
Secure	0 c	09 bc	28 ab	45 a
Achievement oriented	29 b	64 a	33 b	22 b
Caring	67 ab	64 ab	83 a	50 b
Friendly	57 ab	55 ab	78 a	40 b
Self-aware	33 ab	23 b	61 a	15 b

Note: Percentages sharing the same letter are not significantly different ($\alpha = .05$ level).

subjects, 39% of private self-conscious subjects, and 0% of subjects scoring high on both dimensions. Low self-conscious subjects also preferred such traits as "independent" (75%), "out-going" (55%), and "secure" (45%), although these traits also were chosen frequently by private self-conscious subjects (56%, 22%, and 28%, respectively).

In addition, results indicated that publicly self-conscious subjects were approximately twice as likely to endorse "achievement oriented" (64%) compared to the other three groups (average = 27%), whereas privately self-conscious subjects were most likely to endorse "caring" (83%), although this trait adjective was also popular among the other three groups (average = 60%). Finally, privates were more than twice as likely to endorse the term "self-aware" (61%) compared to the other three groups (average = 25.5%).

These findings are noteworthy for several reasons. First, they support previous research suggesting that self-consciousness is not a "content free" construct but rather is related to an individual's identity (Schlenker & Weigold, 1990; Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1987). Second, although trait endorsement overlap did exist for many traits, some traits were endorsed significantly more often by each of the four self-consciousness groups. Interestingly, instead of reflecting a sense of social

maturity, balance, and adjustment, subjects who reported high levels of both public and private self-consciousness endorsed predominantly negative trait adjectives, especially when compared to those endorsed by subjects low in both forms of self-attention.

Thus, two competing views of self-consciousness have emerged. One view suggests that attending to both public and private aspects of self may be related to flexibility and psychological adjustment whereas a lack of self-awareness would reflect alienation from self and others. The other view suggests that high levels of self-attention are aversive and lead to a negative view of self. Refraining from self-reflection would be associated with positive self-images. The following section describes an identity-regulation model of self-consciousness that attempts to frame these differing views in similar terms. That is, the model considers the nature of self-consciousness within an overall theory of how individuals construct, present, and defend views of themselves. After presenting the basic components that were tested, the discussion will turn to a more general analysis of the theories and concepts that compose the foundation of the model. This latter discussion is meant to provide a fuller conceptualization of the model and include speculative ideas regarding self-attention. Following the general discussion, the specific predictions that were tested in

the present study is presented. These predictions are a reiteration and expansion of the general expectations described in the outline of the model. Finally, the experimental procedures employed to test these predictions, as well as the results of the study, are presented.

CHAPTER III
THE IDENTITY-REGULATION MODEL OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS

An Overview

Self-identification is the process, means, or result of showing oneself to be a particular type of person, thereby specifying one's identity (Schlenker, 1984, 1985). A key component of self-identification is self-presentation or the attempt to control the self-images that are formed of an actor by audiences (Schlenker, 1980, 1985; Schlenker & Weigold, 1992). The present model claims that self-consciousness reflects an actor's awareness of those behaviors associated with self-presentation.

Specifically it is held that when an actor lacks the confidence or perceived ability to construct and present a desired view of himself (to self or others), he will focus more attention on those acts or behaviors necessary for successful self-presentations. Thus, compared to those who reported spending little time focusing on themselves, actors who reported being very self-attentive were expected to score higher on measures assessing general expectation of negative self-presentation outcomes. Highly self-conscious individuals also were expected to report possessing less skill at conveying desired impressions of

themselves to audiences. Finally, highly self-aware actors were expected to perceive discrepancies between how they view themselves and both a) how they believe they can and should be and b) how they believe others perceive them.

This model of self-consciousness is consistent with literature suggesting that self-attention occurs, at least in part, so that relevant actions and self-images may be evaluated and, if need be, modified in order to meet specific goals (Arkin & Baumgardner, 1986; Carver & Scheier, 1981, 1985; Greenwald & Breckler, 1985; Schlenker, 1980, 1985). In addition, situations that have been shown to lead to self-awareness, such as viewing one's image in a mirror, being video-taped, or listening to a tape of one's voice (Carver, 1974; Carver & Scheier, 1980, 1981; Duval & Wicklund, 1972), may be seen as heightening awareness of the various attempts or results of negotiating a particular identity.

The model recognizes that low self-presentation confidence and perceived ability held by actors may or may not be based on actual social deficits. If they are based on actual deficits, the actor should be described by others in ways that differ from how he believes he can and should be. After repeated exposure to self-presentation failure and negative feedback from audiences, an actors would be expected to indicate that others view him in ways that differ from how he would ultimately like to be seen.

However, if low self-presentation confidence and perceived ability deficits are based on the actor's misperception of feedback he receives from others (e.g., perceiving non-existent criticism, etc.), the description of him provided by audiences should not be discrepant from his desired self, but rather from how he believes he is seen by others. That is, the actor would most likely report that others view him in ways that are generally negative; actual audiences would probably describe him in more positive terms. Having considered the general model and predictions derived from it, attention now will shift to a discussion of theory underlying the model.

Theoretical Foundation

Self-Identification

Self-identifications are context-bound activities directed at constructing and expressing a theory of self and are affected by the characteristics of the person (e.g., self-beliefs, values, personality traits), the situation (e.g., norms governing appropriate personal and social standards), and the audience (e.g., oneself, real or imagined others) (Schlenker, 1980, 1985). From an initial assessment of these factors, the actor formulates a goal, a plan of action for achieving the goal, and a set of desired identity images that mediate the activity.

Desired identity-images, having been identified in this manner, must be formed and maintained through actual

or imagined interpersonal agreement about what the self is like (Schlenker, 1985). This suggests that one's identity is not a product of the actor's ideal or fantasy self, nor is it merely a reflection of the demands, wishes, and role-expectations of others. Rather, one's identity represents the consensual agreement of what one is like based on feedback the actor receives when presenting his or her self-theories to relevant audiences for testing and judgment.

Self-Presentation

One of the main activities in the self-identification process is self-presentation (Schlenker, 1985). Self-presentation is the attempt to regulate or control the self-images that are formed of an actor by audiences (i.e., self, reference groups, present or imagined others) during real or imagined social interactions (Schlenker, 1980; Schlenker & Weigold, 1992).

Early discussions of self-presentation distinguished it from self-disclosure, viewing the latter as an expression of "true" or "accurate" self-knowledge. Self-presentation, on the other hand, was portrayed as an attempt to create self-serving impressions, often by relying on the use of deception (e.g., attempting to appear courageous by boasting about nonexistent battle experiences) (Schlenker, 1985). More recent theories of self-presentation, however, argue that the activity

consists of an individual's attempt to convey how he wishes to be seen in ways that balance the beneficiality of the identity claim with the believability of such a claim. That is, during self-presentations the actor tries to convey self-images that are glorified but reality-edited versions of how he believes he can and should be (Greenwald & Breckler, 1985; Schlenker, 1986; Schlenker & Weigold, 1992).

With regard to self-consciousness, an important characteristic of self-presentations is that they may be engaged in consciously or unconsciously. Considering the vast wealth of self-relevant information at one's disposal, it is clear that considering or conveying every aspect of oneself is impossible; actors must selectively attend to, edit, and package information in ways that convey desired impressions. Of course, some degree of awareness is necessary during this process; actors must attend to some extent on those components of self (e.g., thoughts, emotions, dress, audience reactions) that are necessary for successfully claiming a particular identity. However, this type of self-presentation attention is proactive, representing the initial, automatic process of calling to mind well-scripted information, habitual behavior, and internalized self-images. Similar notions have been discussed by Leary and Kowalski (1990), who describe how one may scan the social environment and process impression-

relevant information without consciously considering how she is being perceived by others. Further, proactive self-presentation attention may be viewed as arising from a more general information processing style wherein a person attends to one stimulus while monitoring another stimulus at a preattentive level (e.g., Schneider & Schiffman, 1977).

Thus, self-presentations requiring proactive attention are considered to be largely automatic, habitual, and unconscious. In Jamesian terms, such self-presentations would occur when the actor is in the "self-as-knower" state. Self-presentations will continue to be unconscious as long as relevant self-images a) are less central or important to one's identity, b) are readily accessible (i.e., highly internalized, habitualized, and scripted), (c) have been successfully claimed in the past (i.e., the actor possesses the necessary abilities, credential, etc.), d) are likely to go unchallenged (i.e., the audience is friendly, supportive, unimportant, uncritical, of low power and status, etc.) and e) do not conflict with other self-images, internal values, or standards (Schlenker, 1980, 1985, 1986).

However, there are times when self-presentation becomes a conscious, even effortful activity. For example, interviewing for an important job, going on a blind date, or accounting for a poor task performance all represent

situations in which actors actively monitor and assess what they say (and do not say), how they say it, and how the audience responds. In short, actors in such situations are aware of their self-presentations. Individuals will continue to be conscious of their self-presentation behavior when a) self-images and goals are important or central to the actor's identity, b) relevant audiences are powerful, attractive, skeptical, or discerning, c) the actor expects to be unsuccessful at creating the desired impression, d) difficulties have arisen with respect to the identity claim (currently or in the past), and e) relevant self-images conflict with each other or with internal values and standards (Schlenker, 1980, 1985, 1986).

Regarding condition (c), an actor's low self-presentation confidence may be based on a history of actual failure or negative feedback. That is, low confidence may be due to the fact that the actor lacks certain self-presentation skills necessary to create the desired impression (e.g., acting ability, communication skills), and thus has experienced failure many times in the past. Self-presentation failure could also arise if the individual values conflicting self-images that are difficult to convey simultaneously (e.g., autonomous and a team player), leading others to perceive the actor as inconsistent or "mixed-up." As Doherty and Schlenker (1991) speculate, those who attend to both self-aspects "might be

caught in a conflict between public pressures and private beliefs, as they attempt to satisfy both an external audience and themselves" (Doherty & Schlenker, 1991; cf. Schlenker, 1980; Tetlock, 1985).

On the other hand, a general expectation of self-presentation failure may be based on an actor's hypersensitivity to negative or threatening audience feedback, or to an actor's tendency to interpret ambiguous and even positive feedback as actually threatening to the self-image claim. Of course, low self-presentation confidence (i.e., negative outcome expectations) that lacks objective grounds originally may, by itself, lead the actor to fail at his or her self-presentations, thus becoming self-confirming (Rosenthal, 1984; Snyder, 1984; Snyder & Swann, 1978).

The presence of any of these factors should lead an actor to engage in reactive self-presentation attention. This type of attention allows the actor to search more vigorously for supporting evidence, identify relevant self-images that will be accepted by the audience, locate potential defects in self-presentations, and account for discrepancies that may exist between identity claims and self-images, standards, or performances (Schlenker, 1985). Thus, self-consciousness is a product of reactive self-presentation attention which arises when actors expect or experience threats to their identity claims. It should be noted that this proposed etiology of self-consciousness is

not exclusive; the tendency to frequently focus on particular aspects of self may also occur for other reasons (e.g., biological dispositions). Thus, the proposed model recognizes that although self-presentation factors are presumed to influence one's level of self-consciousness, actors may be chronically self-focuses for other reasons as well.

Self-Consciousness and Identity

Although most of us are concerned with personal and social aspects of our identity, some among us may prefer to emphasize one over the other during social interactions. For example, when trying to impress a romantic partner during a date, a person may tend to highlight his or her intellectual skills. Others, however, may find it preferable to accentuate their physical attractiveness. The factors influencing this choice are many, and may include preexisting values, attributes, and talents of the actor, social norms of the situation, and prior knowledge, expectations, and values of the audience. In short, people's preference for one over the other set of attributes will be based on their belief about whether personal or social identity images will allow them to achieve their goals.

In general, self-consciousness theory suggests that those who report focusing on public aspects of themselves frequently should emphasize social aspects of their

identity, whereas those who often attend to covert aspect of self should find personal aspects of their identity more important (Buss, 1980; Cheek, 1989; Cheek & Briggs, 1982).

As noted by Buss (1980):

Other things being equal, private self-conscious people emphasize the individual aspects of their identity. They attend more to the unshared idiosyncracies of their particular experiences, fantasies, and feelings. . . . Public self-conscious people tend to identify with groups. They see themselves as social beings, share attitudes and affiliations with others. . . . These public identities, important for most people, are especially important for people high in public self-consciousness. (p. 122)

Support for this claim comes from several sources. Scores on personal identity importance have been found to correlate with private self-consciousness (r s of .29 to .52), and social identity importance has been found to correlate with public self-consciousness (r s of .30 to .58) (Cheek & Briggs, 1982; Cutler, Lennox, & Wolfe, 1984; Hogan and Cheek, 1983; Penner & Wymer, 1983; Schlenker & Weigold, 1990).

Research by Schlenker and Weigold (1990) also suggests that responses to the Self-Consciousness Scale reflect, at least in part, an expression of two different types of desired identities. These researchers have found that privates prefer to be seen as autonomous and independent whereas publics prefer to be seen as "team players" who often go along with, and depend upon those around them (Schlenker & Weigold, 1990). However, Schlenker and

Weigold find that both groups will change their privately held attitudes if doing so allows them to establish a desired impression on others. Based on these findings, the authors suggest that, for private self-conscious individuals, appearing autonomous may be more important than being autonomous.

The identity-regulation model of self-consciousness may account for the relationship between private self-consciousness and personal identity importance as well as for the relationship between public self-consciousness and social identity importance. The model suggests that attention to public aspects of self (i.e., public self-consciousness) reflects an actor's conscious self-presentation behavior aimed at defending social identity images. Similarly, private self-consciousness is thought to reflect the actor's awareness of self-presentation behavior engaged in as a response to threats to personal identity images. If the actor (believes he) is unable to create, maintain, or defend the desired identity successfully (e.g., personal identity--cannot think of anything intelligent to say; social identity--lacks certain physical attributes), he will be forced to search for supporting evidence, locate whatever defects in his self-presentation exist, and account for discrepancies that the audience is aware of. Thus, public (private) self-consciousness reflects an actor's awareness of his self-

presentations in defense of social (personal) identity claims.

Further Identity Implications

By their very nature, social identity images are inextricably linked to social agreement. An individual must look to others for relevant feedback regarding his social identity, and take into account the verdict reached by audience members. For example, when considering one's reputation or popularity in a group, one must consider the views, opinions, and feedback of those around him. Thus, such identity images are tested in the crucible of real social life and are quite vulnerable to criticism or rejection by others.

Because the opinions of others are important for the validation of social identity images, individuals who place importance on their social identity recognize and value the opinions, wishes, and potential negative evaluations of most others. Any (perceived) threats would be difficult to ignore and would lead the actor to exhibit social fears and trepidation. Because they look to others to validate important aspects of themselves, actors who value their social identities (e.g., public self-conscious persons) should tend to include such traits as dependent, conforming, and socially anxious in their view of self. Consistent with this view, research finds public self-consciousness to be related to social anxiety, shame,

neuroticism, conformity, exhibitionism, and low risk taking (Darville, Johnson, & Danko, 1992; Schlenker & Pennington, 1993; Schlenker & Weigold, 1990; Tunnell, 1984; Turner, Scheier, Carver, and Ickes, 1978).

However, many personal identity images (e.g., intuitive, emotional) may be more sensitive to feedback from oneself or internal audiences than from others. This would be especially true of identity images that are covert or related to privately held goals and desires (e.g., one's dreams and aspirations). Although positive feedback from certain audiences may prove conducive to the incorporation of such personal identity images into one's identity, all audiences may not be equal. That is, internal audiences (e.g., self, reference groups) may be perceived as more relevant judges of the identity claim, or held in higher regard in relevant situations. Because negative feedback from an external audience may be less threatening to desired identity images than internal criticism, privately self-conscious individuals would tend to see themselves as independent, principled, and unique. Consistent with this view, private self-consciousness scores have been found to correlate with independence, non-conformity, and need for uniqueness (Schlenker & Weigold, 1990; Turner, Scheier, Carver, and Ickes, 1978).

This discussion does not suggest that privateers are immune to social expectations and feedback. Rather,

privates may be those who use the reactions of others as an indication of how well they are presenting the identity images that they want to present. Further, such individuals may find the opinions of certain groups (i.e., peer or reference groups) more important than those of other groups (e.g., general society, members of "the establishment"). Therefore, certain types of feedback from certain types of audiences would be expected to greatly influence whether private self-conscious individuals perceive their self-presentations as successful (e.g., when a peer group member informs a private self-conscious person that she is not autonomous and independent, but rather somewhat dependent and conforming, see Schlenker & Weigold, 1990).

Finally, the identity-regulation model also may explain certain aspects of the identities of extremely low and extremely high self-conscious individuals. The former, neither expecting nor perceiving problems with regard to their self-presentations, would be expected to see and describe themselves as self-confident and secure. In contrast, high scores on both self-consciousness subscales, being related to a high level of self-discrepancy, would lead actors to view themselves in negative, self-critical ways. Recent research findings are consistent with this speculative account (Schlenker & Pennington, 1993; Schlenker & Weigold, 1990).

Self-Discrepancy

The term self-discrepancy refers to the presence of conflicts or differences between two or more views of self that an actor may hold (Higgins, 1989). Although not framed in discrepancy terms, William James' view of self-esteem may be interpreted as relevant to the concept. According to James (1890), a person's self-esteem is a reflection of the match between his successes and pretensions. Put another way, those with a strong sense of self-worth have fewer discrepancies between their accomplishments (i.e., those things for which they receive public recognition) and their pretensions (i.e., their aspirations; ideas regarding how they can and should be). Similarly, Duval and Wicklund (1972, Wicklund, 1975) argue that when self-aware, actors become self-evaluative--comparing their conduct or performance against relevant ideal standard. When behavior meets or exceeds standards (i.e., no discrepancies exist), the actor will experience self-satisfaction. However, to the extent that the actor's performance fails to meet such ideals, a heightened awareness of this discrepancy would lead to self-dissatisfaction.

With regard to self-discrepancy, the views of James and those of Duval and Wicklund highlight the interplay between social standards (and feedback) and an actor's view of self. Focusing more within the individual, other

theorists propose similar ideas. For example, Carl Rogers (1959) believed that self-esteem and psychological well-being depend, in part, on the match between how an individual sees herself (i.e., her real self) and the way she ultimately wishes she could be (i.e., ideal self). E. Tory Higgins extends this link between self-discrepancy and emotion.

According to Higgins (1987, 1989), one's self-concept may be viewed as including multiple perspectives and contexts. That is, when considering one's self, an actor may take her own perspective, or she may consider how she is viewed by significant others. In addition, the individual may focus on how she or others view what she is currently like (actual self), what she would ultimately like to be (ideal self), or what she believes she should be like (ought self). Research conducted by Higgins (1989) suggests that specific types of negative affect accompany the presence of different self-discrepancies. For example, dejection-type emotions (e.g., depression, disappointment) have been related to discrepancies between how actors see themselves (or believe others see them) and how they ultimately hope to be (or believe others want them to be) (Higgins, 1989).

The distinction between a real (or actual) and ideal self made by Rogers, Higgins, and others (see Baumeister & Tice, 1986; Tedeschi & Norman, 1985) may be viewed as

consistent with two components of self-images discussed in Barry Schlenker's identity-analytic theory. Schlenker (1980, 1985) claims that one's view of self reflects both the believability and beneficiality of relevant self-images. As does Turner (1968), Schlenker views the self as comprised of self-images that are glorified but reality-edited versions of how we believe we can and should be. From this perspective, the real and ideal selves represent separate components of believability and beneficiality, respectively, that guide which self-images actors choose to claim.

The identity-regulation model of self-consciousness assumes that under normal conditions a person's self-concept should be viewed as consisting of images balancing these two dimensions. However, when considering individuals who claim very negative self-images or who report suffering from chronic negative affect, distinguishing between an "actual" and "desired" self may prove useful. As noted by Schlenker (1985):

Unanticipated good or bad fortune. . . . and the behaviors of others can cast people into identities that are better or worse than the ones they desired. When such a discrepancy goes against the actor. . . . it produces serious personal and interpersonal problems, including negative self-reactions and feelings of rejection by others. . . . (such chronic) cases justify the counselor or clinician's distinction between the real and ideal self. (p. 75)

Because self-consciousness has been found to be related to negative self-images and affect (Darville, Johnson, & Danko, 1992; Ingram & Smith, 1984; Larsen & Cowan, 1988; Schlenker & Pennington, 1993; Schlenker & Weigold, 1990; Tunnell, 1984; Turner, Scheier, Carver, & Ickes, 1978), the present model distinguishes between actual and desired selves, with the former representing how people believe they are and the latter representing how they believe they can and should be.

A third type of self discussed in the model, the "perceived self," represents people's perceptions of how they are viewed by those around them. The historical roots of such a concept can be traced back to pragmatic philosophers (e.g., James, 1890) as well as symbolic interactionists (e.g., Cooley, 1922; Mead, 1934). As mentioned earlier, Higgins (1987, 1989) proposes three "perceived selves," each of which represents how an actor believes others view his actual, ideal, and ought selves. Although subjects may be able to distinguish among different types of perceived selves when instructed to do so, such a task may be foreign and difficult for subjects, as well as time-consuming--thereby limiting the investigator's ability to collect more relevant types of data. Thus, self-discrepancies (or the lack thereof) examined in the present study pertain to subjects' actual, desired, and (general) perceived selves.

Affect, Self-Consciousness and Self-Discrepancy

Research examining the link between affect and self-attention indicates that public and private self-consciousness differ with respect to related negative emotions. Public self-consciousness has been associated with social anxiety (Darville et al., 1992; Hope & Heimberg, 1985; Schlenker & Pennington, 1993), whereas private self-consciousness has been found to correlate with various measures of depression (Ingram & Smith, 1984; Larsen & Cowan, 1988; Smith, Ingram, & Roth, 1985; Smith & Greenberg, 1981). This pattern of associations suggests that public and private self-consciousness relate to different kinds of self-discrepancies.

Social anxiety refers to the aversive feelings experienced by those who want to create a desired impression on others but doubt their ability to do so (Leary, 1983b; Schlenker & Leary, 1982). This suggests that socially anxious individuals tend to expect others to form a view of them that does not reflect how they would like to be seen. In fact, public self-consciousness has been found to contribute to inaccurate perceptions of an actor on the part of observers (Bernstein & Davis, 1982). Based on these factors, public self-conscious individuals were expected to possess discrepancies between their desired and perceived selves, especially on traits related to social identity.

As mentioned previously, researchers consistently have found positive correlations between private self-consciousness and depression, the latter also being related to actual/ideal self-discrepancy scores (Higgins, 1987, 1989). A direct link between private self-focus and self-discrepancy has been found by Smith, Ingram, and Roth (1985), who report a positive relationship between private self-consciousness and actual/ideal self-discrepancy scores. Interestingly, focusing on private aspects of self has not been shown to contribute to feelings of social anxiety (e.g., Darville et al., 1992; Hope & Heimberg, 1985). In fact, this self-focus tendency may be negatively related to such an emotion (Schlenker & Weigold, 1990) and privates have been found to be perceived by others in ways that match how they describe themselves (Bernstein & Davis, 1982; Cheek, 1982; Franzoi, 1983; Underwood & Moore, 1981). Based on these findings, it was predicted that, although private self-consciousness would be positively related to actual/desired self-discrepancies, it would not be associated with desired/perceived self-discrepancies.

Summary and Predictions

The identity-regulation model of self-consciousness is a broad theoretical attempt to understand the constructs related to extremely high and low levels of self-attention directed toward public and private aspects of self. The model claims that, in an attempt to control the kinds of

impressions that are formed by audiences, actors often must focus on relevant components of their self-presentations. This is especially likely when an actor believes that an audience (self, reference, or external) views him in ways that are dissimilar to both how he sees himself and how he would like to be seen. Inwardly directed attention would allow the individual to respond to such threats by accessing additional self-relevant information, conveying this new information, and accounting for previous failures. Alternatively, when people believe that the audience shares their view of self, they should spend less time attending to how they access, convey, and defend self-relevant information.

Based on this reasoning, the model predicts that a tendency to be highly attentive to public aspects of self to the exclusion of private aspects reflects an actor's lack of confidence and skill in conveying desired social identity images to others. Therefore, such individuals were expected to provide descriptions of their desired social selves that differed from how they described their perceived social selves. Fewer personal identity images were expected to be included in such discrepancies. Attention to covert aspects of self, however, was expected to be related to the attempt to construct and defend desired personal identity images, especially to oneself or private audiences. Therefore, private self-conscious

individuals were expected to perceive discrepancies between their actual and desired selves, especially on personal identity dimensions.

Following this reasoning, it was expected that those both publicly and privately self-consciousness would exhibit the highest degree of self-discrepancy, possessing both types of self-discrepancies. Specifically, such individuals were expected to describe their desired selves in ways that differed from both how they believe that actually are (i.e., actual/desired self-discrepancy) and how they believe they are viewed by others (i.e., desired/perceived self-discrepancy). Further, the former self-discrepancy was expected to involve personal identity images and the latter was expected to involve social identity images.

In contrast, it was predicted that those low in both types of self-consciousness would describe their desired selves in ways consistent with their description of how they actually are (i.e., small actual/desired self-discrepancies) and how they believe others view them (i.e., small desired/perceived self-discrepancies). It should be noted that the above-mentioned predictions pertain to self-discrepancies existing within subjects. The model distinguishes between such self-discrepancies and discrepancies that may exist between subjects' perceived selves and descriptions of them provided by their friends.

CHAPTER IV METHODOLOGY

Method

Subjects

Based on public and private self-consciousness scores obtained during pretesting, 127 extreme scorers were recruited. Subjects consisted of 32 who scored in the upper quartile on both subscales (high highs), 31 who scored in the lower quartile on both subscales (low lows), 34 who scored in the upper quartile on the public self-consciousness subscale and lower quartile on the private self-consciousness subscale (publics), and 30 who scored in the lower quartile on the public subscale and upper quartile on the private subscale (privates). Subjects were telephoned and instructed to bring a same-sex friend with them to the laboratory.

Procedure

Upon arrival to the laboratory, subjects and their friends were informed of the general nature of the study (see Appendix A for the informed consent forms). Next, participants completed an experimental questionnaire (see Appendix B for the subject questionnaire and Appendix C for the friend questionnaire). Upon completion of the questionnaire, subjects and their friends were fully

debriefed regarding the nature of the study and their participation in it (see Appendix D for the debriefing form).

Measures

The experimental questionnaire for subjects consisted of measures designed to assess self-presentation confidence and skill, as well as subjects' actual, desired, and perceived selves. The scales and materials that comprised these measures appear in Appendix B.

Self-Presentation Confidence. Generalized self-presentation confidence was measured using the Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (BFNE) (Leary, 1983a; Watson & Friend, 1969) and the Interaction Anxiousness Scale (IAS) (Leary, 1983b). The 12 item BFNE scale is designed to assess concerns regarding negative evaluations. The items of the brief version are taken from Watson and Friend's (1969) original 30 item Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale. The original authors conceptualize the construct as involving both apprehension and expectation of negative evaluation (although the majority of items appear to tap the former rather than the latter) (Leary, 1991).

Psychometric properties of the BFNE are quite good. With regard to reliability, the brief version of the scale has been found to correlate highly with the original version ($r = .96$). In addition, for the BFNE scale, item-total correlations range from .43 to .47, Cronbach's alpha

coefficient is .90, and test-retest reliability for a one month interval is .75 (Leary, 1991). With regard to validity, the (original) scale has been found to correlate positively with both the Social Avoidance and Distress Scale ($r = .51$) and the Interaction Anxiousness Scale ($r = .32$), and negatively with the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale ($r = -.25$) (Leary, 1991). Finally, as compared to low scorers, those who score high on the (original) scale have been found to be more anxious and uneasy in evaluative settings and to report being more bothered by possible negative evaluations (Friend & Gilbert, 1973; Leary, 1991).

The IAS contains 15 items designed to measure feelings of social anxiety independently of anxiety related behavior (i.e., inhibition, reticence, awkwardness) (Leary, 1983b, 1991) and generally has been found to correlate positively with other measures of social anxiety and shyness ($r_s > .60$) (Jones, Briggs, & Smith; Leary & Kowalski, 1987) and negatively with the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale ($r = -.26$) (Leary, 1991). In addition, as compared to low scorers, those who score high on the IAS a) report experiencing more evaluation apprehension, anxiety, and less confidence before and during social interactions, b) are judged by others as appearing less confident and nervous and c) exhibit higher levels of social avoidance and inhibition (Leary, 1983c, 1986; Leary, Atherton, Hill,

& Hur, 1986). Finally, tests of reliability of the IAS report item-total correlations of at least .45, Cronbach's alpha coefficients of .87 and greater, and an 8 week test-retest correlation of .80 (Leary, 1991). High scores on the Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale and the Interaction Anxiousness Scale were viewed as reflecting generally low levels of confidence in one's self-presentations.

Self-presentation ability. Self-presentation ability was measured using the following scales: a) the Interpersonal Control Scale and Personal Efficacy Scale of the Spheres of Control Battery Items (Paulhus, 1983), b) the Multidimensional-Multiattribubtional Causality Scale (MMSC) (Lefcourt, von Baeyer, Ware, & Cox, 1979) and c) the original Self-Monitoring Scale (SMS) (Snyder, 1974).

The Spheres of Control Battery Items is comprised of three, 10 statement scales. The Interpersonal Control Scale (ICS) measures an actor's self-reported ability to manage face-to-face interactions and interpersonal relationships. The Personal Efficacy Scale (PES) is designed to assess beliefs about the mastery of one's nonsocial environment and concerns regarding personal achievement. Due to time constraints and the lack of theoretical relevance, the Sociopolitical Control Scale was not included in the experimental materials.

The ICS and PES have been found to correlate negatively with Rotter's Internal-External locus of control scale ($r = -.28$ and $-.37$, respectively, indicating a more internal locus of control). In addition, the PES has been found to be positively correlated with Machiavellianism scores (Lefcourt, 1991), the latter having been identified as one of a number of constructs reflective of self-presentation skill (Schlenker, 1980). As evidence of discriminant validity, in a sample of 110 students, the PES and ICS correlated weakly with both the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale ($r_s = .19$ and $.11$, respectively) and a verbal comprehension measure of the Guilford-Zimmerman tests ($r_s = .01$ and $.16$, respectively) (Lefcourt, 1991). With regard to reliability, the PES and ICS have alpha coefficients of $.75$ and $.77$, respectively, and test-retest correlations above $.90$ for a 4-week interval and $.70$ for a 6-month period (Paulhus, 1983).

The Multidimensional-Multiattributational Causality Scale is made up of two scales--Achievement and Affiliation. Each scale is designed to assess subjects' locus of control in its respective domain. These scales were created based on the authors' contention that two important goals for university students (the target population) include the demonstration of academic competence and the development and maintenance of close friendships (Lefcourt, 1991). Each scale contains four

subscales (Ability, Effort, Context, and Luck), with each subscale comprised of 6 statements designed to assess causal beliefs regarding achievement and affiliation outcomes. For example, the Ability subscale of the Affiliation scale contains a) 3 statements indicating that successful affiliations are due to an actor's ability (e.g., "having good friend's is simply a matter of one's social skill") and b) 3 statements suggesting that unsuccessful relationship outcomes are due to an actor's lack of social skill (e.g., "I feel that people who are often lonely are lacking in social competence"). This same format is followed for the Effort, Context, and Luck subscales.

When the scales are scored such that higher numbers indicate more external attributions, responses have been found to correlate with Rotter's Internal-External Locus of Control Scale ($r_s = .23$ to $.62$ for achievement and $.37$ to $.55$ for affiliation) (Lefcourt, 1991). In addition, affiliation scores have been associated with such social skills as listening behavior and social interaction competence, whereas achievement scores correlate with behavior and affective responses in achievement tasks (Lefcourt, 1981; Lefcourt, Martin, Fick, & Saleh, 1985). Regarding discriminant validity, affiliation scores have been found not to correlate with the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale ($r = .01$). However, a significant

negative correlation has been reported between the Achievement Scale and social desirability ($r = -.33$). The authors suggest that this relationship, which is derived mainly from correlations between social desirability and the achievement-externality items ($r = -.30$), reflects students' recognition that it is not very acceptable to attribute achievement outcomes to external causes while in an academic environment (Lefcourt, 1991).

Attributional patterns expressed by subjects for their successes and failures in academic and affiliative domains were conceptualized in the present study as a multi-component self-report measure of ability. To the extent that subjects' perceive themselves as skilled in such domains, they were expected to indicate that their successes were due to internal, controllable factors (i.e., ability and effort) and their failures to external, uncontrollable ones (i.e., context, luck). The exact opposite pattern (i.e., internal/controllable factors for failures and external/uncontrollable factors for successes) was predicted for those who perceive themselves as less skilled in such domains.

Finally, although the conceptualization described above is consistent with theory and research findings regarding the scale, it is possible that attribution styles also reflect subjects' general confidence levels regarding their performances in academic and achievement domains. In

other words, subjects confident in their self-presentation abilities may provide attributions for academic and achievement outcomes that differ from their less confident counterparts, irrespective of subjects' actual self-presentation ability. Thus, findings involving the scale will be discussed using a more general framework of attributional style rather than a specific one of ability or confidence.

Measures of internal consistency for the two scales have been obtained from several samples, with Cronbach alpha values ranging between .58 and .80 for the Achievement Scale and between .62 and .84 for the Affiliation Scale. In addition, corrected Spearman-Brown split-half correlations have been found to range from .61 to .65 for affiliation and .67 to .76 for achievement (Lefcourt, 1991). Measures of temporal stability for these scales include test-retest reliability coefficients ranging from .50 to .70 for affiliation and .51 to .62 for achievement (intervals range from 1 week to four months) (Lefcourt, 1991).

The original 25 item version of the Self-Monitoring Scale (SMS) was designed to measure individual differences in the ability to observe and control expressive behavior and self-presentations (Snyder, 1974). Although debate exists regarding its structural properties (Briggs & Cheek, 1986, 1988; Briggs, Cheek, & Buss, 1980; Gangestad &

Snyder, 1985; Lennox & Wolfe, 1984; Snyder, 1979; Snyder & Gangestad, 1986), the SMS may be viewed as consisting of 3 subscales: Social Stage Presence, Expressive Self-control, and Other-directedness (Gangestad & Snyder, 1985; Snyder & Gangestad, 1986). Expressive Control reflects the ability to control expressive behavior whereas Social Stage Presence taps the propensity to perform in social situations and attract social attention to oneself. The third subscale, Other-directedness, measures the tendency to display what others expect one to display in social situations.

Research on the Self-Monitoring Scale indicates that high self-monitors tend to be extroverted, good actors, and willing to change their behavior to suit others (Briggs & Cheek, 1988; Briggs, Cheek, & Buss, 1980). In fact, professional stage actors score higher on the SMS as compared to non-actors (Snyder, 1974). High self-monitors also have been shown to a) have a concern for the appropriateness of behavior, b) give careful attention to others for cues as to what is appropriate, c) be skillful in presenting many different behaviors in different situations and d) be able to change their manner of self-presentation (Gabrenya & Arkin, 1980). Discriminant validity tests have found responses to the SMS to be slightly related (negatively) to responses on both the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale ($r = -.19$) and the

Psychopathic Deviate scale of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory ($r = -.20$) (Snyder, 1974). Indices of reliability for the Self-Monitoring Scale include Kuder-Richardson 20 reliability coefficients of between .63 and .70 and a test-retest reliability of .83 for a 1 month interval (Snyder, 1974).

For the present study, high scores on the a) Interpersonal Control and Personal Efficacy scales, b) Ability and Effort subscales of the Achievement and Affiliation Scales and c) Expressive Control and Social Stage Presence factors of the Self-Monitoring Scale were regarded as reflecting subjects' self-reported ability to create desired impressions on others. The Luck and Context subscales of the Achievement and Affiliation Scales and the Other-directedness subscale of the Self-Monitoring Scale were assumed to tap a less successful self-presentation style (i.e., self-protection), and hence, high scores on these scales were regarded as reflecting lower levels of self-presentation ability.

Materials

In addition to measures of self-presentation outcome expectation and ability, the present study included measures designed to assess subjects' actual, desired, and perceived selves, in addition to friends' descriptions of subjects. The three selves were assessed by asking subjects to indicate how characteristic a series of trait

adjectives is of themselves, using a 10 point scale (0 = not at all characteristic of me, 9 = extremely characteristic of me). Because of the relationship between self-consciousness and identity importance, it was thought that a more accurate assessment of identity (as well as self-discrepancy) would be obtained by including an equal number of trait adjectives reflecting each of the two identity dimensions. With this goal in mind, pilot testing was conducted to generate an equal number of negative and positive trait-adjectives reflecting social and personal identity images.

Pilot testing. During pilot testing, 72 subjects were asked to rate 200 trait adjectives on their relevance to one's social and personal identity (see Appendix E for the trait adjective rating form). The trait adjectives were initially generated by identifying words, on an a priori basis, that the author felt reflected the identity statements included in the Aspects of Identity Questionnaire (AIQ) (Cheek and Briggs, 1982; Cheek, 1989). The AIQ is composed of personal identity and social identity statements; respondents are asked to rate each statement according to how important it is to their sense of who they are. Items of the personal identity section include "my emotions and feelings," "my dreams and imagination," "my personal values and moral standards," and "knowing that I continue to be essentially the same inside

even though life involved many external changes." Items of the social identity section include "the groups to which I belong," "my reputation," and "the way I am seen by others."

Of the 200 pilot tested trait adjectives, 42 were used in the present study. Based on subjects' ratings, 13 social and 13 personal identity trait adjectives were employed. Social identity adjectives were those rated as more relevant to one's social identity ($M = 3.9$) than to one's personal identity ($M = 3.2$). Positive trait adjectives reflective of this dimension included "popular," "funny," and "outgoing;" negative counterparts included "rude" and "socially anxious". Personal identity trait adjectives were those rated as more relevant to one's personal identity ($M = 3.9$) than to one's social identity ($M = 3.1$). Positive trait adjectives reflecting this dimension included "tender," "reflective," and "hopeful;" a smaller number of terms similar in meaning but negative in valence were included (e.g., depressed, self-critical). The average positivity rating for each group of identity trait adjectives was identical ($M = 3.6$).

In addition, 4 trait adjectives that were, a priori, deemed relevant to one's personal identity (i.e., ethical, individualistic, skeptical, and stable) and 4 a priori social identity trait adjectives (i.e., admired, tactful, theatrical, sociable) were included. Although the a priori

social identity traits were rated as more relevant to one's social identity than personal identity ($M = 3.95$ versus 3.4, respectively), this difference was not as large as that for social identity traits chosen based on pilot testing results. Similarly, although the difference was not as large as that for the pilot testing data based personal identity trait adjectives, the a priori personal identity adjectives were rated as more relevant to one's personal identity than social identity ($M = 3.95$ versus 3.55, respectively). The average positivity ratings for the social and personal identity trait adjectives were equal ($M = 3.88$). Finally, 8 trait adjectives that were rated as relevant to both one's social identity ($M = 4.2$) and personal identity ($M = 4.2$) were included in the present study (average positivity rating = 4.6). The a priori trait adjectives and adjectives deemed relevant to both types of identities were included so that a larger number and wider array of descriptive adjectives could be employed in the study. See Appendix F for a listing of all 42 individual trait adjectives and pilot testing rating values.

Subjects' self-description forms. To assess subjects' various selves, 3 different sets of instructions preceded the trait adjective list. These 3 instructional sets were

presented in counterbalanced order. For the actual self description form, the instructions read:

Consider for a moment your 'actual self'--that is, the self that reflects what you are currently like. After you've considered this, please indicate how characteristic each of the following trait adjectives is of you, using the 10 point scale below. Remember, your ratings should reflect how you actually see yourself.

For the desired self description form, instructions read:

Consider for a moment your 'desired self'--that is, the self that reflects how you believe you can and should be, given your abilities, limitations, accomplishments, and goals. After you've considered this, please indicate how characteristic each of the following trait adjectives is of your desired self, using the 10 point scale below. Remember, your ratings should describe you at your best, but should be believable to both yourself and others.

For the perceived self description form, instructions read:

Consider for a moment your 'perceived self'--that is, the self that reflects how you believe you are seen by your friend (i.e., the person who you brought to this study). How would that person rate you on each of the following adjectives? Once you've considered this, please rate how characteristic each of the following adjectives is of you from the perspective of that person, using the 10 point scale below. Remember, your ratings should reflect how your friend would describe you.

Friends' description of subjects forms. Subjects' friends completed a different experimental questionnaire (See Appendix C). These individuals were asked to describe what their friends (subjects) are like by rating them on the same trait adjectives appearing in the subjects' self

description forms. The instructions for the Friend's Description of Subject Form read:

Please indicate how characteristic each of the following adjectives is of your friend (i.e., the person with whom you came to the study), using the 10 point scale below. Your ratings should reflect how you actually see your friend.

Friends also rated subjects on the self-presentation confidence measures (i.e., Interaction Anxiousness Scale, Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale) and several of the self-presentation skill measures completed by subjects (i.e., Self-Monitoring Scale, Personal Efficacy and Interpersonal Control subscales of the Spheres of Control Battery). Specifically, subjects' friends were instructed to read the items of each scale and report the degree to which each was characteristic or true of their friend, using a 5 point scale. See Appendix C for these scales.

Self-consciousness scale. Subjects' friends completed the Self-Consciousness Scale (SCS) (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975). The 17 item SCS was given to a larger group of introductory psychology students at the beginning of the semester during a mass pre testing session; subjects of the present study were recruited from this larger group. Subjects' friends completed the SCS during the experimental session. The SCS is designed to measure individual differences in the tendency to focus on public and private aspects of self and consists of three subscales: private self-consciousness, public self-consciousness, and social

anxiety (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975). The private self-consciousness subscale consists of 10 items measuring the extent to which individuals monitor covert aspects of self (e.g., internal states, moods, and thoughts). The 7 item public self-consciousness subscale contains items that measure the tendency to focus on the self as a social object (e.g., one's style, dress, appearance). A third set of items tapping social anxiety was not included during pre testing (due to space constraints) and was replaced by the IAS in the subject's experimental questionnaire.

The SCS was administered during mass pre testing so that extreme scorers could be identified and recruited. Subjects' friends completed the scale to determine whether a relationship exists between self-consciousness scores of friendship dyads. Based on research showing similarity to be a large component of liking and attraction (Byrne, 1971; Neimeyer & Mitchell, 1988; Newcomb, 1961), a positive relation was predicted on both public and private self-conscious scores between subjects and their friends.

Self-Discrepancy and Identity-Discrepancy Measures

All four self-description forms (e.g., actual, desired, perceived, friends') contained the same trait adjectives, thereby allowing the author to create subject self-discrepancy and subject-friend identity discrepancy scores. To calculate subject self-discrepancy scores, ratings for each of the 42 trait adjectives of one self

description form were subtracted from their corresponding 42 trait adjective ratings on the other two self-description forms (i.e., a subject's actual/desired self-discrepancy score reflects the average of the absolute differences between trait adjective ratings 1 through 42 for the actual self and desired self forms). The same procedure was used to calculate subject-friend identity agreement scores, which reflect the average absolute difference between subjects' perceived self-ratings and friends' descriptions of subjects. Finally, subject-friend self-presentation discrepancy scores were calculated using this method.

Increasingly large values on these measures indicate higher levels of self-discrepancy and lower levels of subject-friend identity and self-presentation agreement. Because the adjectives listed in the self-description forms were grouped into social and personal identity items, self-discrepancy and subject-friend identity discrepancy scores were calculated for both personal and social identity. Subject-friend self-presentation discrepancy scores were composed of 5 self-presentation dimensions (e.g., confidence: social anxiety, fear of negative evaluation; skill: self-monitoring, personal efficacy, and interpersonal control).

Data Analyses and Predictions

Self-Presentation Constructs

Scores on each of the self-presentation outcome expectation and skill measures were analyzed using a 2 (public self-consciousness: high / low) by 2 (private self-consciousness: high / low) by 2 (sex: male / female) factorial analysis of variance (ANOVA). To the extent that self-consciousness reflects reactive self-presentation attention, main effects of public and private self-consciousness were predicted. Subjects low in public and private self-consciousness were expected to exhibit the lowest scores on the negative outcome expectation measures. Subjects high in both types of self-consciousness were expected to possess the highest scores. Finally, subjects high on only one self-consciousness subscale (i.e., publics and privates) were expected to have negative outcome expectation scores falling in between those of the other two groups.

The possibility that reactive self-presentation attention stems from subjects' lack of self-presentation ability led to the tentative prediction of two self-consciousness main effects for the ability measures. Specifically, subjects who reported the lowest levels of self-reflection were expected to have the highest scores on the measures whereas subjects who reported the highest levels were expected to have the lowest scores. For public

self-conscious and private self-conscious subjects, it was predicted that scores on these measures would fall between those of the other two groups. With regard to the Luck and Context subscales of the Affiliation Scale and the Other-directedness subscale of the SMS, the exact opposite pattern of scores was predicted.

Self-Discrepancy

Self-discrepancy scores were entered into a 2 (public self-consciousness: high / low) by 2 (private self-consciousness: high / low) by 3 (self-discrepancy type: actual-desired / actual-perceived / desired-perceived) by 2 (trait adjective identity type: personal / social) mixed model factorial analysis of variance (ANOVA). Public and private self-consciousness were both between-subject variables whereas self-discrepancy type and trait adjective identity type were both within-subject variables. A four-way interaction was predicted.

Specifically, subjects who reported reflecting on both public and private aspects of self were expected to have the largest discrepancy scores, consisting of large desired/perceived self and large actual/desired self discrepancies. Their low counterparts were expected to have the smallest such discrepancy scores. Those either publicly self-conscious or privately self-conscious were expected to exhibit moderate self-discrepancy scores, with each group's score reflecting a different set of identity

trait adjectives contributing to the size of the overall score. It was predicted that publicly self-conscious subjects would have larger discrepancy scores between their desired and perceived selves for social identity trait adjectives compared to personal identity adjectives. Privates were expected to have larger discrepancy scores between their actual and desired selves for personal identity trait adjectives.

Subject-Friend Self-Presentation and Identity Discrepancy

Subjects' friends were asked to rate them on several self-presentation confidence measures (i.e., fear of negative evaluation and social anxiety) and self-presentation ability measures (emotional control, social stage presence, other-directedness, interpersonal control, and personal efficacy). Subjects' friends also rated subjects on the social and personal identity trait adjectives contained in subjects' self description forms. Friends' descriptions were compared to subjects' self-reported levels of self-presentation confidence and ability, as well as to their descriptions of their actual, desired, and perceived selves. From these comparisons subject-friend discrepancy scores were calculated, reflecting the average absolute difference between subjects' ratings and the ratings on equivalent dimensions provided by their friends. Thus, higher discrepancy scores

indicate less agreement between subjects and friends regarding what the subject is like.

Each of the subject-friend discrepancy scores was entered into a 2 (public self consciousness: high / low) by 2 (private self-consciousness: high / low) by 2 (sex: male / female) factorial analysis of variance (ANOVA). These analyses were conducted to test the possibility that the predicted lack of self-presentation confidence exhibited by highly self-conscious actors is based on discrepancies between their own self-views and how others view them.

It should be noted that the present model framed actor-friend discrepancy predictions in terms of absolute differences existing between actors' self-descriptions and those provided by their friends; the direction of such discrepancies was not predicted. In the case of actor-friend self-presentation discrepancies (i.e., confidence and skill), overall self-consciousness group means were used to indicate in what way subjects' self-reports differed from their friends' descriptions.

In addition, the actual, desired, and perceived self description forms completed by subjects and the subject identity form completed by friends contained both positive and negative trait adjectives. Specifically, two negative social identity trait adjectives (out of 17) and two negative personal identity trait adjectives (out of 17) were included in order to represent a more diverse array of

potential self-descriptions. Because of the relatively small number of negative traits, specific predictions were not made with regard to discrepancies and trait valence. However, previous research suggests that, in general, subjects would rate positive trait adjectives as more self-descriptive than negative ones (Hollander, 1985; Messick, Bloom, Boldizar, & Samuelson, 1985; Schlenker, Miller, Leary, & McCown, 1979). The descriptions provided by subjects' friends were not expected to exhibit the same degree of positivity bias.

Subject-Friend Self-Consciousness Similarity

Subjects recruited for the present study were extreme (quartile) scorers on the public and private subscales of the Self-Consciousness Scale. Because of the restricted range of self-consciousness scores of these subjects, friends' self-consciousness scores were entered into a 2 (subject's public self-consciousness score: high / low) by 2 (subject's private self-consciousness: high / low) factorial analysis of variance. Based on the link between similarity and liking described earlier, main effects of public and private self-consciousness were predicted. Specifically, friends' of subjects who reported frequently attending to public (private) aspects of self were expected to exhibit greater public (private) self-consciousness scores, compared to the friends of less public (private) self-conscious subjects.

CHAPTER V

RESULTS

Results from the performed analyses are grouped under conceptually related headings, reflecting the major dependent measures under investigation. No main effects of sex were found for any of the dependent measures; this variable also did not qualify any of the results discussed below. In addition, tables appearing in the body of the text depict only those means relevant to the effects reported. For the means of dependent measures that did not differ as a function of self-consciousness, please refer to Tables 9 and 10 located in Appendix H.

Self-Presentation Confidence

Consistent with predictions, main effects of public self-consciousness were found for both measures of self-presentation confidence. As depicted in Table 2, public self-conscious subjects reported a greater fear of negative evaluation ($M = 3.65$ versus 2.46), $F(1, 123) = 92.2$, $p < .0001$, and higher levels of social anxiety ($M = 2.85$ versus 2.33), $F(1, 123) = 20.4$, $p < .0001$, compared to low public self-conscious subjects. Contrary to predictions, no private main effects were observed, $F_s(1, 123) < 1$. Also,

Table 2. Effects of public self-consciousness on self-presentation measures.

	Public Self-Consciousness					
	High			Low		
	Private Self-Consciousness			Private Self-Consciousness		
	High	Low	X	High	Low	X
SP Confidence						
FNE	3.84	3.47	3.65 a	2.43	2.48	2.46 b
SA	2.97	2.73	2.85 a	2.38	2.28	2.33 b
SP Skill						
EC	3.08	3.16	3.12 a	2.80	2.87	2.84 b
OD	3.05	3.04	3.04 a	2.57	2.71	2.64 b
Attributions-Acad. Failure						
Ability	4.15	3.75	3.94 a	3.33	3.38	3.36 b
Context	4.45	4.72	4.59 a	4.18	4.07	4.12 b
Affil. Success						
Ability	4.36	4.20	4.28 a	3.93	3.40	3.66 b
Effort	5.06	4.75	4.90 a	4.54	4.24	4.39 b
Context	5.52	4.96	5.23 a	4.80	4.17	4.48 b
Luck	3.45	3.41	3.43 a	2.94	2.99	2.97 b
Affil. Failure						
Ability	4.21	4.11	4.16 a	3.54	3.58	3.56 b
Luck	4.23	3.97	4.19 a	3.69	3.53	3.61 b
Subj-Friend SP Discrepancy						
FNE	1.33	1.40	1.37 a	1.17	1.00	1.08 b
SA	1.26	1.16	1.21 a	1.04	1.09	1.06 b
SSP	1.20	1.30	1.26 a	1.06	1.02	1.04 b
OD	1.35	1.27	1.30 a	1.08	1.08	1.08 b
Friend SC by Subj SC Group						
PbSC	3.80	3.81	3.80 a	3.51	3.58	3.55 b

KEY: FNE = Fear of Negative Evaluation, SA = Social Anxiety, EC = Emotional Control, OD = Other-Directedness, SSP = Social Stage Presence, Acad. = Academic, Affil. = Affiliation, PbSC = Public Self-Consciousness.

NOTE: a > b, p < .05.

for self-presentation confidence measures, no interactions were found.

Self-Presentation Skills

Analyses of subjects' self-presentation ability reports indicated main effects of public and private self-consciousness. As predicted, compared to their low counterparts, subjects who reported frequently focusing on public aspects of themselves scored higher ($M = 3.04$ versus 2.64) on the Other-Directedness subscale of the Self-Monitoring Scale, $F(1, 123) = 27.2$, $p < .0001$. Contrary to predictions, such subjects also reported greater expressive control in social situations ($M = 3.12$ versus 2.84), $F(1, 123) = 8.40$, $p < .005$ (see Table 2 for means). Although Social Stage Presence scores were expected to be lower for self-conscious individuals, this dimension of Self-Monitoring did not differ as a function of public or private self-consciousness.

In addition to the public self-conscious main effects described above, a main effect of private self-consciousness was found for personal efficacy scores. As shown in Table 3, subjects high on this self-reflective dimension reported a greater degree of personal efficacy in achievement domains than did those low in private self-reflection ($M = 5.3$ versus 4.96), $F(1, 123) = 6.18$, $p < .02$. Although self-consciousness was expected to lead to lower personal efficacy scores in general, the more

Table 3. Effects of private self-consciousness on self-presentation measures.

	Private Self-Consciousness					
	High			Low		
	Public Self-Consciousness			Public Self-Consciousness		
	High	Low	X	High	Low	X
SP Ability						
PE	5.30	5.30	5.30 a	5.07	4.84	4.96 b
Attributions-Acad. Success						
Ability	5.41	5.33	5.37 a	5.04	4.68	4.87 b
Effort	5.48	5.38	5.43 a	5.05	4.65	4.86 b
Affil. Success						
Context	5.52	4.80	5.17 a	4.96	4.17	4.58 b
Affil. Failure						
Context *	4.26	3.82	4.05 a	3.65	3.46	3.56 b
Subj-Friend Id Discrepancy						
5. Per-o	1.87	1.91	1.89 b	2.12	2.11	2.11 a
6. Per-p	1.95	1.89	1.92 b	2.26	2.15	2.21 a
7. Per-s/p	1.43	1.56	1.49 b	1.85	2.04	1.94 a

KEY: SP = Self-Presentation, PE = Personal Efficacy, Acad. = Academic, Affil. = Affiliation, Per-o = Perceived Self-Overall Identity, Per-p = Perceived Self-Personal Identity, Per-s/p = Perceived Self-Social and Personal Identity.

NOTE: a > b, \underline{p} < .05. * = \underline{p} < .061.

specific measure of self-presentation skill, interpersonal control, did not differ as a function of self-consciousness, $F_s(1, 123) < 1$.

Attributions for Affiliation and Achievement Performance

Four types of attributions for successful and unsuccessful performances in academic and affiliative domains were measured: context, luck, effort, and ability. In general, increased levels of public and private self-consciousness were expected to lead subjects to attribute academic and affiliative successes to external, uncontrollable factors (i.e., context, luck); attributions focusing on internal, controllable factors (i.e., ability, effort) were expected to be offered by less self-reflective subjects. These predictions were only partially supported. Public self-conscious subjects attributed academic failures to their level of ability ($M = 3.94$ versus 3.36) as well as to the influence of contextual factors ($M = 4.59$ versus 4.12), more so than their low public self-conscious counterparts, $F(1, 123) = 6.35$, $p < .02$, and $F(1, 123) = 5.80$, $p < .02$, respectively. Public self-consciousness did not affect attributions for success in academic pursuits, $F_s(1, 123) < 1$.

Regarding attributions for affiliation outcomes, public self-conscious subjects unexpectedly reported that all four attributional dimensions influenced their successful performances more so than did low public self-

conscious subjects (ability: \bar{M} = 4.28 versus 3.66; effort: \bar{M} = 4.90 versus 4.39; context: \bar{M} = 5.23 versus 4.48; luck: \bar{M} = 3.43 versus 2.97), F_s (1, 132) > 4.28, p_s < .05. Although the observed attribution differences between high and low public self-conscious subjects regarding factors of luck and context were expected, the effort and ability attribution effects contradicted predictions.

Finally, as predicted, public self-conscious subjects attributed affiliative failures to ability more so than did those low in public self-consciousness, (\bar{M} = 4.16 versus 3.56), F (1, 123) = 6.91, p < .01. Unexpectedly, such subjects also reported that luck played a larger role in such failures compared to their low public self-conscious counterparts, (\bar{M} = 4.19 versus 3.61), F (1, 123) = 8.65, p < .004.

Subjects high in private self-consciousness attributed their academic successes to their level of ability and effort more so than did low private self-conscious subjects ($\bar{M}s$ = 5.37 versus 4.87 and 5.43 versus 4.86), F (1, 123) = 6.47, p < .02, F (1, 123) = 10.9, p < .002, respectively. Attributions for academic failures did not differ as a function of private self-consciousness, F_s (1, 123) < 1. In general, these results are contrary to predictions derived from the identity-regulation model of self-consciousness. However, as predicted, regarding the more relevant domain of behavior--affiliation--subjects high in

private self-consciousness attributed their successes to contextual factors more so than did their low counterparts ($M = 5.17$ versus 4.58), $F(1, 123) = 11.2$, $p < .001$. For affiliation failures, this private self-consciousness main effect was marginally significant, ($M = 4.05$ versus 3.56), $F = 3.57$, $p < .061$. No other self-consciousness main effects or interactions were found for these attributional measures.

Self-Discrepancy

A four-way interaction was predicted for self-discrepancy scores. Actors with the highest (lowest) levels of self-consciousness were expected to have the highest (lowest) self-discrepancy scores. Publics and privates were expected to have moderate self-discrepancy scores implicating either their social or personal identities, respectively.

In general, very little support for these predictions was found. Analyses revealed a public self-consciousness by self-discrepancy type by trait adjective type 3-way interaction, $F(2, 246) = 5.51$, $p < .005$. Focused contrasts indicated that, for the social identity trait adjective groupings, the actual-perceived self-discrepancy scores for subjects low in public self-consciousness were significantly lower than their actual-desired and desired-perceived self discrepancy scores, $F_s(1, 123) > 4.31$, $p_s < .05$ (see Table 4 for means). As will be discussion in the

next chapter, these results may be viewed as consistent with the underlying tenets of the identity-regulation model; however, these specific effects were not predicted from the model, the expected four-way interaction was not found, and no other differences in self-discrepancy size were observed.

Table 4. Self-discrepancy scores as a function of public and private self-consciousness.

	Social			Identity			Personal		
	Self-Discrepancy			Self-Discrepancy			Self-Discrepancy		
	A-D	A-P	D-P	A-D	A-P	D-P	A-D	A-P	D-P
High PbSC	1.69	1.26	1.76	1.70	1.35	1.81	1.70	1.35	1.81
Low PbSC	1.83 b	1.08 a	1.86 b	1.58	1.31	1.74	1.58	1.31	1.74
High PrSC	1.78	1.22	1.80	1.63	1.32	1.79	1.63	1.32	1.79
Low PrSC	1.74	1.12	1.71	1.65	1.34	1.76	1.65	1.34	1.76

Key: A = Actual Self, D = Desired Self, P = Perceived Self, PbSC = Public Self-Consciousness, PrSC = Private Self-Consciousness.

Note: a < b, p < .05.

Subject-Friend Discrepancy

Subject-friend discrepancy scores were analyzed to test whether the expected low self-presentation confidence and higher self-discrepancies exhibited by self-conscious subjects were due to biased perceptions regarding how they believe they are perceived by others. The discrepancy scores described below reflect absolute differences between subjects' self-descriptions and those provided by their

friends; the direction of subject-friend discrepancies was not calculated. However, when subject-friend discrepancies were found, overall self-consciousness group means were used to determine in what way subjects differed from their friends.

Self-Presentation Confidence

Regarding fear of negative evaluation and social anxiety, high public self-conscious subjects' reports were more discrepant from their friends' descriptions than were those of low public self-conscious subjects ($\bar{M} = 1.37$ versus 1.08 for FNE, $\bar{M} = 1.21$ versus 1.06 for SA), $F(1, 123) = 12.3$, $p < .001$, $F(1, 123) = 4.41$, $p < .04$, respectively. Specifically, public self-conscious subjects described themselves as more fearful of negative evaluation ($\bar{M} = 3.66$) and more socially anxious ($\bar{M} = 2.85$) than did their friends ($\bar{M}s = 2.87$ and 2.33, respectively). These results support a "biased perceptions" explanation of the low self-presentation confidence exhibited by public self-conscious subjects.

Self-Presentation Ability

Similarly, high public self-conscious subjects' scores on the Social Stage Presence and Other-directedness subscales of the Self-Monitoring Scale were more discrepant from their friends' descriptions of them compared to subject-friend discrepancies of low public self-conscious subjects ($\bar{M} = 1.26$ versus 1.04 for Social Stage Presence),

$F(1, 118) = 6.82, p < .01, (M = 1.30 \text{ versus } 1.08 \text{ for Other-directedness}), F(1, 118) = 9.07, p < .004, \text{ respectively.}$ Examination of group means indicates that, compared to descriptions of them provided by their friends, subjects high in public self-consciousness described themselves as being less able to perform in social situations and draw attention to themselves ($M = 3.42 \text{ versus } 2.83$); publics also described themselves as more other-directed, as compared to their friends ($M = 3.04 \text{ versus } 2.76$). Finally, subject-friend discrepancy scores for personal efficacy and interpersonal control did not differ as a function of self-consciousness, $F_s(1, 118) < 1$.

Identity

Twelve subject-friend identity discrepancy scores were calculated. Subjects' actual, desired, and perceived selves were compared to their friends' description of them; comparisons were made for each of the 4 identity types (i.e., overall, social, personal, both social and personal). Table 5 through Table 8 depicts how the 4 self-conscious groups rated their actual, desired, and perceived selves, as well as how friends rated them.

Results indicated that discrepancies between subjects' actual and desired self descriptions and friend's descriptions did not differ as a function of public or private self-consciousness, $F_s(1, 132) < 1.4$. Thus, the

tendency to focus on public or private aspects of self does not appear to stem from differences between how actors view themselves (or wish to be) and how others describe them.

However, regarding subjects' perceived self descriptions, results indicated a main effect of private self-consciousness, $F(1, 123) = 5.36$, $p < .03$. Contrary to predictions, high private self-conscious subjects had lower overall subject-friend identity discrepancy scores compared to low private self-conscious subjects ($M = 1.89$ versus 2.11). Separate analyses revealed that, compared to their low counterparts, high private self-conscious subjects had lower discrepancy scores for personal identity trait adjectives, $F(1, 123) = 6.53$, $p < .012$, ($M = 1.92$ versus 2.21), as well as for trait adjectives rated (during pilot testing) as relevant to both personal and social aspects of identity, $F(1, 123) = 12.3$, $p < .006$, ($M = 1.48$ versus 1.94). High and low private self-conscious subjects did not differ on subject-friend discrepancies for social identity trait adjectives, $F(1, 123) < 1$.

Subject-Friend Self-Consciousness Similarity

Though only marginally significant, the predicted main effect of public self-consciousness on subject-friend self-consciousness similarity was found. Friends of public subjects tended to have higher public self-consciousness scores compared to friends of subjects low on that self-focus dimension, ($M = 3.80$ versus 3.55), $F(1, 121) = 3.64$, $p <$

.059. Unexpectedly, friends' private self-consciousness scores did not differ as a function of subjects' level of private self-consciousness, $F(1, 121) < 1$.

CHAPTER VI DISCUSSION

Self-Presentation Confidence

Based on the assertion that self-consciousness reflects reactive self-presentation attention, it was predicted that increased levels of public and private self-consciousness would lead to lower self-presentation confidence, as evidenced by higher scores on measures of social anxiety and fear of negative evaluation. Results of the present study supported this contention for public self-consciousness. Compared to low public self-conscious subjects, those who frequently focus on public aspects of themselves reported lower levels of self-presentation confidence.

Contrary to predictions, private self-consciousness did not affect subjects' self-presentation confidence levels. In fact, the responses of subjects high in this type of self-focus did not show much correspondence to the relevant specific predictions of the model. A discussion of possible reasons for this will be postponed until the theoretical implications of the study are considered. However, as will be discussed in more detail shortly, private self-consciousness did influence some self-

presentation related behaviors in ways that may be viewed as consistent with general propositions of the model.

Based on the theoretical underpinnings of the identity-regulation model of self-consciousness, two possible explanations for lower self-presentation confidence in self-conscious individuals may be entertained. First, such actors may lack self-presentation ability; alternatively, such actors may hold biased perceptions as to how they are viewed by others. Results of this study suggest that the merit of each explanation depends on the type of self-consciousness under consideration. In order to elaborate on this, the discussion will consider the effects surrounding each type of self-consciousness.

Attribution Style, Self-Presentation Ability,
and Perception Accuracy

Private Self-Consciousness

As predicted, high private self-conscious subjects indicated that the context of the situation played a larger role in their successes in affiliative domains than did low private self-conscious subjects. For example, compared to their low counterparts high private self-conscious subjects agreed more strongly to statements such as "My enjoyment of a social occasion is almost entirely dependent on the personalities of the other people who are there," "Some people can make me have a good time even when I don't feel sociable," and "To enjoy myself at a party I have to be

surrounded by others who know how to have a good time." As described in the materials section, attributing positive self-presentation outcomes to uncontrollable factors such as context (or luck) may be viewed as less advantageous. By making such attributions for positive self-presentation efforts, these subjects are, in effect, denying themselves credit for their accomplishments and casting themselves in ineffectual roles.

Importantly, high and low private self-conscious subjects did not differ to as great an extent in attributing affiliative outcomes to the context of the situation when doing so might be most beneficial (i.e., for affiliative failures). Also, the pessimistic affiliation attributional pattern evidenced by subjects high in private self-consciousness contrasts with the optimistic manner in which they accounted for their successes in academic achievement domains. For such positive outcomes these subjects indicated that their level of ability and effort were more influential, compared to their low counterparts. Thus, the attributional patterns offered by private self-conscious subjects indicate that such actors lack high levels of self-presentation confidence/ability, at least when compared to their levels of confidence/ability in non-social domains.

This pattern of results is also reflected in private self-conscious subjects' scores on other measures of

general and self-presentation ability. In responding to the Spheres of Control Battery, participants described their beliefs regarding their mastery of their non-social environment (i.e., personal efficacy) and their ability to manage face-to-face interactions and personal relationships (i.e., interpersonal control). Compared to their low counterparts high private self-conscious subjects reported that they had a greater mastery over their non-social environment, agreeing with such statements as "When I get what I want it's usually because I worked hard for it" and "My major accomplishments are entirely due to hard work and intelligence." However, this greater sense of general mastery enjoyed by subjects high in private self-focus disappeared when such mastery involved social situations and interactions (e.g., "If there's someone I want to meet I can usually arrange it."). Thus, as exhibited in the attribution findings, compared to their low private self-conscious counterparts high privates described themselves as in control and responsible for positive outcomes primarily when the task or situation was non-social in nature. In affiliative or social situations, this increase in control and responsibility was no longer observed.

The results described thus far indicate that on direct measures of self-presentation ability private self-conscious subjects did not differ to a great extent from those who focus on private aspects of self infrequently.

However, when interpreting the attribution and control effects in an overall context of self-reported abilities, there appears to be some indirect support for the contention that higher levels of private self-attention lead actors to report diminished self-presentation effectiveness.

According to the identity-regulation model of self-consciousness, one possible source of private self-attention stems from a biased perception of how one is viewed by others (especially for personal aspects of identity). Regarding this possibility, results from the present study are clear: such self-attention does not reflect biased perceptions. For example, high private self-consciousness levels did not lead to greater discrepancies between subjects' views of what they are actually like (i.e., actual self descriptions) and their friends' description of them. To the contrary, compared to their low private self-conscious counterparts, those who reported frequently focusing on private aspects of self were actually more accurate in describing how their friends viewed them, at least on trait adjectives that may be considered relevant to one's personal identity. This finding is consistent with previous research indicating that private self-conscious persons tend to be perceived by others in ways that match how they describe themselves (Franzoi, 1983; Underwood & Moore, 1981), especially when

such individuals possess self-expressive abilities (Cheek, 1982) or when observers spend a longer period of time watching them (Bernstein & Davis, 1982).

However, it is worth reiterating that subjects in previous research were asked to describe themselves, not how they thought others view them. In the present study, the increased subject-friend identity agreement enjoyed by high private self-conscious subjects pertained to personal identity dimensions of their perceived selves. That is, frequently attending to private aspects of self afforded subjects greater insight into how they were viewed by their friends on important identity dimensions. In this study, such self-focus did not lead subjects' friends to hold more accurate views as to how subjects described their actual selves.

Given the findings of previous research, one may question why this was the case. One possible explanation revolves around the fact that, unlike most past research on this topic, subjects in the present study were rated by their friends (as opposed to unknown observers). It is likely that one's friends enjoy a great deal of knowledge regarding what one is like, especially when compared to that of unknown observers. If true, such knowledge may have lead friends to be quite accurate in their descriptions regarding what subjects were like, irrespective of subjects' self-consciousness levels. This

suggests that increases in actor-observer identity agreement enjoyed by private self-conscious individuals may depend on the level of familiarity between those involved.

Public Self-Consciousness

Regarding the possibility that focusing on public aspects of oneself arises from an actor's lack of self-presentation ability, the results may be viewed as generally supportive. Compared to their low counterparts high public self-conscious subjects described themselves as more other-directed, endorsing more strongly such statements as "In order to get along and be liked, I tend to be what people expect me to be rather than anything else" and rejecting such statements as "I would not change my opinions (or the way I do things) in order to please someone or win their favor." It appears as if individuals with this orientation engage in self-presentation behavior motivated by the desire to be liked by others, even at the cost of being overly conforming or even deceptive. Although such behavior may prove useful in certain situations (e.g., initial interpersonal encounters), when used as a long-term self-presentation strategy, it would likely lead actors to experience low self-esteem and a lack of respect from others. Thus, when viewed in this manner, other-directedness appears to reflect a less than optimal self-presentation style.

Unexpectedly, public self-conscious subjects also described themselves as having greater control over their emotional expressions, endorsing such statements as "Even if I am not enjoying myself, I often pretend to be having a good time" and "I sometimes appear to be experiencing deeper emotions than I actually am." Although this attribute was initially believed to comprise a positive self-presentation skill, in retrospect it appears to reflect, at least in part, the desire to fit in with and avoid antagonizing others. When considered together, other-directedness and emotional expressive control may represent a social-interaction strategy that is problematic for actors, especially when carried out with low expectations for success. That is, actors high in public self-consciousness may frequently control their emotional expressions in an effort to gain the approval of others. Such a strategy, when enacted by individuals who lack self-presentation confidence, may prove ineffective or taxing, or otherwise lead the actor to feel as though he or she is "putting on an act" to please others. Although this interpretation of the self-monitoring results is speculative, it does suggest that the effects of public self-consciousness on self-presentation ability is complex.

Equally complex are the attributions that high public self-conscious subjects offered for their successes and failures in affiliation domains. Compared to their low

counterparts, high public self-conscious subjects more strongly indicated that their affiliative successes were due to internal, controllable factors (i.e., ability, effort), as well as to external, uncontrollable ones (i.e., context, luck). Similarly, attributions for failures in affiliative domains were mixed; high public self-conscious subjects differed from their low counterparts by reporting a larger causal impact for one internal, controllable factor (i.e., ability) and on one external, uncontrollable factor (luck). This pattern was repeated for attributions for failures in academic achievement domains. As compared to their low counterparts, high public self-conscious subjects placed a stronger emphasis on their own ability (internal / controllable) as well as on the influence of the contextual factors of the situation (external / uncontrollable).

As mentioned earlier, self-consciousness was presumed to arise from an actor's lack of self-presentation confidence and, possibly, skill. Thus, as compared to less self-focused subjects, self-conscious subjects were expected to offer causal attributions for academic and affiliative successes that stressed external, uncontrollable behavioral influences and de-emphasized internal, controllable ones. Unexpectedly, high public self-conscious subjects generally stressed both dimensions. Why such subjects provided this type of attribution pattern

is unclear. One possibility is that public self-conscious subjects exhibited a response bias, agreeing with every possible behavioral influence provided. Such an explanation, however, is inconsistent with the fact that, for affiliative and academic failures, only one of the two internal / controllable and one of the two external / uncontrollable dimensions was implicated.

Another possible explanation is that public self-conscious subjects wanted to provide attributions that, in general, appeared complex and flexible. Such an attribution pattern may be an attempt to plan for all possible performance outcome contingencies, thus keeping one's options open. In the event that public self-conscious actors are asked to account for their self-presentation performance, adopting such an attributional style may be advantageous; depending on the performance outcome and nature of the task, one could tailor his or her explanation to satisfy the inquiring audience. It should be stressed, however, that both explanations are offered tentatively and speculatively; the pattern of attributions observed were not predicted and represent a puzzling question requiring further empirical examination.

Regarding identity, the increase in subject-friend agreement (for the perceived self) observed in high private self-conscious subjects was not found for those high in public self-consciousness. Public self-consciousness also

did not affect the level of agreement between friends' description of subjects and a) subjects' actual selves and b) subjects' desired selves. Complementary findings suggest that those reporting frequently focusing on public aspects of self were described by their friends in ways discrepant from their own self-views. Specifically, compared to those offered by their low counterparts the self-presentation confidence and skill descriptions provided by high public self-conscious subjects differed from those provided by their friends. Examining high and low public self-consciousness group means (for subjects and their friends), subjects high in public self-consciousness were, as a group, described by their friends as less socially anxious and less fearful of negative evaluation compared to their own overall self-reports. In addition, friends of high public self-conscious subjects indicated that these individuals had a greater social stage presence and were less other-directed than subjects reported. These findings suggest that, on non-identity dimensions, public self-conscious persons view themselves in ways that are quite discrepant from how they are viewed by a close other.

Self-Discrepancy

The Identity-Regulation Model of Self-Consciousness predicted that high levels of self-focused attention, created by low self-presentation confidence and/or ability, would result in higher discrepancy levels between actors'

selves. Further, the type of self-attention (e.g., public versus private self-consciousness) was expected to correspond to the type of identity (e.g., social versus personal) involved. The self-discrepancy results obtained in the present study did not follow this predicted pattern, although the results may be viewed as consistent with the general proposals of the model as they pertain to public self-consciousness.

Regarding traits that, during pilot testing, were judged to be relevant to one's social identity, subjects low in public self-consciousness exhibited smaller discrepancies between their actual and perceived selves compared to discrepancies between their a) actual and desired selves and b) desired and perceived selves. That is, those who infrequently focus on public aspects of self reported that their friends (correctly) perceive how they actually are compared to the other two possible self-discrepancies, though this was only true for identity traits related to social aspects of self.

This finding suggests that low public self-conscious actors differ from their public self-focused counterparts in that the former believes others' have formed an accurate view of them along important identity dimensions, at least when compared to the other self-discrepancies that they hold. This is consistent with the general proposition that self-focused attention arises from the belief that one is

failing (or has failed) to establish a desired identity. It also is consistent with the fact that greater subject-friend agreement regarding subjects' level of self-presentation confidence and skill existed for low, compared to high public self-conscious individuals. Thus, the lower actual-perceived self-discrepancy scores exhibited by such actors does seem to enjoy some external validation.

Although the public self-consciousness effect described above may be viewed as consistent with the general propositions of the present model, caution should be observed in interpreting its significance. First, a similar, less pronounced pattern of self-discrepancies was found for a) personal identity traits of low public self-conscious subjects and b) both social and personal identity traits of high public self-conscious subjects and both high and low private self-conscious subjects. Second, no direct self-discrepancy differences were found between high and low public self-conscious subjects. Finally, self-discrepancies did not differ as a function of private self-consciousness.

The importance of the self-discrepancy construct for the identity-regulation model of self-consciousness prompts to us to question why so few differences existed on this dimension as a function of self-consciousness. One possible reason revolves around the methodology of the present study. When calculating self-discrepancy scores,

other researchers (e.g., Higgins, 1987, 1989) have employed trait adjectives generated by subjects. However, in an attempt to equate trait adjectives on theoretically important dimensions (i.e., positivity, personal and social identity relevance), the present study employed pilot tested, experimenter generated trait adjectives. It is possible that such trait adjectives did not represent adequately the core identity components of the participants. To the extent that irrelevant trait adjectives were used, one would expect few differences between subjects' various selves.

A second possible reason that so few self-discrepancy differences were found rests on the nature of the construct itself. The proposed model asserts that actors become self-focused when discrepancies arise between their various selves. Further, to the extent that such self-discrepancies are salient and long in duration (or recurring), actors are expected to exhibit a chronic tendency to be self-attentive (i.e., self-conscious). Although this may be the case, measures of self-consciousness may not be very predictive of existing discrepancies between an individual's various selves. Perhaps subjects in the present study did not mentally represent self-discrepancies in specific, trait-like terms. Rather, such discrepancies may have been encoded at a more general level, such as "I need to be a better person and

live up to my potential" or "I wish others saw me in a more positive light." Given the methodology of the present study, evidence for self-discrepancy differences would be difficult to obtain if subjects did, in fact, hold such general representations.

Subject-Friend Self-Consciousness Similarity

Based on the positive relationship between similarity and liking described in the attraction literature (Byrne, 1971; Neimeyer & Mitchell, 1988; Newcomb, 1961), subjects' self-consciousness levels were expected to resemble those of their friends. As predicted, friends of high public self-conscious subjects did report focusing on public aspects of themselves more than did friends of those low in public self-consciousness.

The literature on attraction recognizes a variety of dimensions upon which being similar leads to liking, including attitudes (Byrne, 1971), ideals (Wetzel & Insko, 1982), preferred activities (Lydon, Jamieson, & Zanna, 1988) and needs and personalities (Berscheid & Walster, 1978, Buss, 1984). However, similarity in self-reflective tendencies has yet to be recognized as a potential dimension in liking and attraction. Results from this study indicate that, at least with regard to public self-consciousness, such an inclusion may be warranted.

Considering underlying mechanisms for such an effect, it is possible that public self-consciousness similarity is

due to similarities between actors and their friends on dimensions of self-presentation confidence and ability. Rather than preferring those who are like them in self-focus tendencies per se, perhaps public self-conscious subjects were attracted to (and thus brought as friends to the study) those equally lacking in confidence and skill in their efforts at presenting desired identities to others. One can imagine how persons who doubt their ability (or who lack the ability) to create desired impressions may prefer others similarly disposed; such actors may find extremely confident, effective self-presenters to be intimidating and superior. Likewise, confident and able self-presenters may find doubt-ridden, incompetent individuals aversive or limiting to be around. This explanation is plausible; however, because the necessary data to test it is not available from this study, additional research on this topic is required.

Contrary to predictions, friends' private self-consciousness levels did not differ as a function of subjects' level of private self-focus. The tentative explanation offered to account for the observed public self-consciousness similarity effect may be enlightening in this case. Recall that self-presentation confidence levels did not differ between high and low private self-conscious subjects; thus, the hypothesized underlying mechanism for differences in affiliative preferences does not exist for

these two groups. Regarding the lower self-presentation ability of private self-conscious subjects, it should be noted that this was reflected in context attributions for affiliative successes. To the extent that such indices are internal to the actor and seldom witnessed or known by others they would do little to create overt, observable differences among actors that might serve as the basis for attraction.

This view is consistent with the notion that private self-conscious individuals are generally more concerned with personal aspects of their identity--aspects that are not created (or shaped) by social feedback to the degree that social identity dimensions are. Thus, the social nature of the identities important to public self-conscious actors may make differences more salient to potential friends than the personal identity dimensions emphasized by private self-conscious actors. Future research examining this explanation is necessary.

Summary, Theoretical Implications, and Conclusions

Results of the present study do not support the proposed identity-regulation model of self-consciousness in its entirety, although several specific predictions were supported and various additional findings may be viewed as consistent with the basic propositions of the model. In general, the proposed model was considerably more accurate in its description of the antecedents and consequences of

public than private self-consciousness. As predicted, compared to their low counterparts, high public self-conscious subjects expressed lower self-presentation confidence, having reported a greater fear of negative evaluation and higher levels of social anxiety. Regarding lower self-presentation ability, these subjects also indicated that they are oriented toward others to a greater degree compared to low public self-conscious subjects. Finally, as predicted, subjects and friends were similar in the extent to which they reported focusing on public aspects of self.

Although not specifically predicted, several additional findings regarding public self-consciousness appear consistent with the model's general arguments. For example, those who reported focusing extensively on public aspects of self held self-views that differed from how their friends viewed them, albeit on non-identity dimensions. Friends of these subjects described them as less fearful of negative evaluations, less socially anxious, and less other-directed--in short, more confident and skilled self-presenters than these subjects indicated.

Although subjects were not asked to indicate how their friends would describe them on such dimensions, it is clear that public self-conscious subjects paint a rather pessimistic view of themselves--one that does not appear warranted based on descriptions provided by their friends.

This link between public self-focus and discrepant self-other views is consistent with the finding that those who report focusing on public aspects of self infrequently indicated that (for social identity dimensions) their friends view them in ways similar to how they actually are. Taken together, these findings are consistent with the possibility that self-directed attention arises when discrepancies between an actor's self-view and others' perceptions of that actor exist.

Finally, public self-conscious subjects provided few responses that directly contradicted descriptions of them provided by the model. The most notable was that such subjects reported having greater control of their emotional expressivity compared to their low counterparts. Although this was initially unexpected, when considered in conjunction with the fact that such subjects were also other-directed, one may interpret this behavior as an attempt to present a pleasing front to others at the expense of free emotional expression. Given these findings, it is reasonable to conclude that the model was generally informative regarding the nature of public self-consciousness.

In contrast, the proposed model was rather inaccurate in its description of the antecedents and consequences of private self-consciousness; possible reasons for this fact will be taken up shortly. The only specific prediction

regarding subjects high in this type of self-focus was the finding that they indicated that contextual factors of situations play a larger role in their affiliative successes compared to their low counterparts. Additional, indirect support for the model stems from an interpretation of the finding that high private self-conscious subjects reported greater efficacy in non-social, but not social domains, compared to their low counterparts.

Also, private self-conscious subjects provided several response patterns that were inconsistent with predictions of the model. Most notably, such subjects were more, rather than less, accurate in their ability to predict how their friends view them on personal identity dimensions. Also, contrary to predictions, high and low private self-conscious subjects did not differ on direct measures of self-presentation confidence and ability. Finally, subjects and friends did not share similar levels of private self-focus. Thus, the model was considerably less informative regarding the nature of private self-consciousness.

In accounting for this discrepancy in explanatory success, several reasons may be considered. One possible explanation centers around the notion that the distinction between public and private self-consciousness is a false one. For example, Wicklund and Gollwitzer (1987) do not consider public self-consciousness to be a specific type of

self-attention. Rather, they argue that scores on the public self-consciousness subscale reflect social dependence. If this is true, then the proposed model would, in fact, explain social dependence (as operationally defined by scores on the public self-consciousness subscale) rather than self-attention.

This explanation has some merit. Subjects high in public self-consciousness did describe themselves as more other-directed than did low public self-conscious subjects. In addition, to the extent that social dependence is related to a lack confidence in one's social abilities, such an explanation would be consistent with the fact that public self-conscious subjects reported being less confident in their self-presentation efforts compared to their low self-focused counterparts.

One finding that does not seem to follow from Wicklund and Gollwitzer's conceptualization of public self-consciousness is the fact that subjects high on this type of self-focus described themselves in ways that differed from their friends' description of them. Although not explicitly contradictory, this finding (which is consistent with propositions outlined in the model) would not be necessarily expected if subjects' public self-consciousness scores were simply measures of social dependence.

A second possible explanation is that differences in the identities important to public and private self-

conscious individuals affect the model's ability to accurately explain both types of self-focus. Public self-conscious actors have been described as placing greater importance on social components of identity whereas private self-conscious actors have been depicted as stressing personal aspects of identity (Buss, 1980; Cheek & Briggs, 1982; Cutler, Lennox, & Wolfe, 1984; Hogan and Cheek, 1983; Penner & Wymer, 1983). Identity-regulation is, to a great extent, interpersonal in nature; thus, a model of self-consciousness stemming from this approach could be expected to explain self-presentation behavior concerning interpersonally construed identities (i.e., social identities) better than identities less dependent on social construction (i.e., personal identities). This possibility suggests that the proposed identity-regulation model should be "fine tuned" so as to better account for behavior surrounding the construction and defense of desired personal identities. Such modifications may lead the model to be more predictive of the antecedents and consequences of private self-consciousness.

In conclusion, the present study represents an initial test of the proposed identity-regulation model of self-consciousness. A moderate amount of support for the model was found, especially with regard to public self-consciousness. However, many of the model's specific predictions were unsupported or contradicted by the study's

findings. Further, various corollary propositions of the model were presented but not tested in the present study. Therefore, theoretical revisions and additional research is required to adequately examine and resolve these issues.

APPENDIX A
INFORMED CONSENT FORMS

(For subjects) This experimental questionnaire is designed to measure some of your personal tendencies and some of your self-beliefs. Your responses to this questionnaire will be made anonymously - please do not write your name or any other identifying information anywhere on the questionnaire. For the purposes of this study, your questionnaire will be assigned a random experimental number. We appreciate your participation in our study. You may choose not to answer any question you do not wish to answer. Also, you may stop participating in this study at any time you choose without penalty.

This study will take approximately 50 minutes. For participating in this study you will receive two credits toward the introductory psychology experiment requirement. If you have any questions about this study, you may contact John Pennington at 392-2732, or Dr. Barry Schlenker, at 392-0526.

(For Friends) This experimental questionnaire is designed to assess your perceptions of your friend (the person with whom you arrived at the lab). You will also complete several scales designed to assess personal tendencies and self-beliefs. All of your responses will be made anonymously - please do not write your name or any other identifying information anywhere on the questionnaire. For the purposes of this study, your questionnaire will be assigned a random experimental number.

We appreciate your participation in our study. You may choose not to answer any question you do not wish to answer. Also, you may stop participating in this study at any time you choose without penalty.

This study will take approximately 50 minutes. If you have any questions about this study, you may contact John Pennington at 392-2732, or Dr. Barry Schlenker, at 392-0526.

APPENDIX B
SUBJECTS' QUESTIONNAIRE

Subjects' "Actual Self" Description Form

Consider for a moment your **"actual self"** -- that is, the self that reflects what you are currently like. After you've considered this, please indicate how characteristic each of the following trait adjectives is of you by circling the appropriate number. Please use the scale below.

	Not at all Characteristic			Somewhat				Extremely Characteristic			
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
impressive	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
depressed	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
considerate	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
ethical	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
popular	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
tender	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
responsible	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
attractive	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
reflective	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
stylish	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
romantic	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
admired	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
confident	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
rude	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
analytical	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
lovable	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
individualistic	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
socially anxious	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
imaginative	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
intellectual	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
funny	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
introspective	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
tactful	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
charming	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
Self-critical	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
goal-oriented	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
skeptical	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
influential	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	

	Not at all			Somewhat				Extremely			
	Characteristic							Characteristic			
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
creative	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
fashionable	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
self-evaluative	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
theatrical	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
honest	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
envied	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
emotional	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
outgoing	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
respectable	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
hopeful	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
diplomatic	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
dreamer	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
sociable	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
stable	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	

Subjects' "Desired Self " Description Form

Consider for a moment your "desired self" -- that is, the self that reflects how you believe you can and should be, given your abilities, limitations, accomplishments, and goals. After you've considered this, please indicate how characteristic each of the following trait adjectives is of your desired self, using the 10-point scale below. Remember, your ratings should describe you at your best, but should be believable to both yourself and others.

	Not at all Characteristic			Somewhat				Extremely Characteristic			
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
impressive	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
depressed	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
considerate	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
ethical	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
popular	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
tender	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
responsible	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
attractive	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
reflective	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
stylish	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
romantic	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
admired	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
confident	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
rude	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
analytical	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
lovable	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
individualistic	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
socially anxious	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
imaginative	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
intellectual	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
funny	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
introspective	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
tactful	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
charming	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
Self-critical	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
goal-oriented	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
skeptical	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
influential	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
creative	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
fashionable	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
self-evaluative	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
theatrical	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
honest	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	

	Not at all Characteristic			Somewhat				Extremely Characteristic			
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
envied	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
emotional	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
outgoing	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
respectable	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
hopeful	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
diplomatic	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
dreamer	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
sociable	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
stable	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	

Subjects' "Perceived Self" Description Form

Consider how you are seen by your **friend** (i.e., the person who you brought to this study). How would that person rate you on each of the following adjectives? Once you've considered this, please rate how characteristic each of the following adjectives is of you from the perspective of that person, using the 10-point scale below. Remember, your ratings should reflect how your friend would describe you.

	Not at all Characteristic			Somewhat				Extremely Characteristic			
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
impressive	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
depressed	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
considerate	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
ethical	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
popular	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
tender	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
responsible	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
attractive	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
reflective	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
stylish	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
romantic	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
admired	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
confident	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
rude	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
analytical	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
lovable	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
individualistic	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
socially anxious	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
imaginative	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
intellectual	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
funny	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
introspective	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
tactful	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
charming	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
Self-critical	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
goal-oriented	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
skeptical	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
influential	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
creative	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
fashionable	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
self-evaluative	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
theatrical	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
honest	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	

	Not at all Characteristic			Somewhat					Extremely Characteristic				
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9			
envied	0		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9		
emotional	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9			
outgoing	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9			
respectable	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9			
hopeful	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9			
diplomatic	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9			
dreamer	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9			
sociable	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9			
stable	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9			

Interaction Anxiousness Scale

- 1 = The statement is not at all characteristic of me.
 - 2 = The statement is slightly characteristic of me.
 - 3 = The statement is moderately characteristic of me.
 - 4 = The statement is very characteristic of me.
 - 5 = The statement is extremely characteristic of me.
-
- 1. I often feel nervous even in casual get-togethers.
 - 2. I usually feel uncomfortable when I am in a group of people I don't know.
 - 3. I am usually at ease when speaking to a member of the opposite sex. (R.S.)
 - 4. I get nervous when I must talk to a teacher or boss.
 - 5. Parties often make me feel anxious and uncomfortable.
 - 6. I am probably less shy in social interactions than most people. (R.S.)
 - 7. I sometimes feel tense when talking to people of my own sex I don't know them very well.
 - 8. I would be nervous if I was being interviewed for a job.
 - 9. I wish I had more confidence in social situations.
 - 10. I seldom feel anxious in social situations.
 - 11. In general, I am a shy person.
 - 12. I often feel nervous when talking to an attractive person of the opposite sex.
 - 13. I often feel nervous when calling someone I don't know very well on the telephone.
 - 14. I get nervous when I speak to someone in a position of authority.
 - 15. I usually feel relaxed around other people, even people who are quite different from myself. (R.S.)

Spheres of Control Battery Items

Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Agree

Interpersonal Control Subscale

1. Even when I'm feeling self-confident about most things, I still seem to lack the ability to control interpersonal situations. (R.S.)
2. I have no trouble making and keeping friends.
3. I'm not good at guiding the course of a conversation with several others. (R.S.)
4. I can usually establish a close personal relationship with someone I find sexually attractive.
5. When being interviewed I can usually steer the interviewer toward the topics I want to talk about and away from those I wish to avoid.
6. If I need help in carrying out a plan of mine, it's usually difficult to get others to help. (R.S.)
7. If there's someone I want to meet I can usually arrange it.
8. I often find it hard to get my point of view across to others. (R.S.)
9. In attempting to smooth over a disagreement I usually make it worse. (R.S.)
10. I find it easy to play an important part in most group situations.

Personal Efficacy Subscale

1. When I get what I want it's usually because I worked hard for it.
2. When I make plans I am almost certain to make them work.
3. I prefer games involving some luck over games requiring pure skill. (R.S.)
4. I can learn almost anything if I set my mind to it.
5. My major accomplishments are entirely due to hard work and intelligence.
6. I usually don't make plans because I have a hard time following through on them. (R.S.)
7. Competition encourages excellence.
8. The extent of personal achievement is often determined by chance. (R.S.)
9. On any sort of exam or competition I like to know how well I do relative to everyone else.
10. Despite my best efforts I have few worthwhile accomplishments. (R.S.)

The Multidimensional-Multiattributitional Causality Scale

Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Agree

Achievement**Ability**

1. The most important ingredient in getting good grades is my academic ability.
2. I feel that my good grades reflect directly on my academic ability.
3. When I get good grades, it is because of my academic competence.
4. If I were to receive low marks it would cause me to question my academic ability.
5. If I were to fail a course it would probably be because I lacked skill in that area.
6. If I were to get poor grades I would assume that I lacked ability to succeed in those courses.

Effort

1. In my case, the good grades I receive are always the direct result of my efforts.
2. Whenever I receive good grades, it is always because I have studied hard for that course.
3. I can overcome all obstacles in the path of academic success if I work hard enough.
4. When I receive a poor grade, I usually feel that the main reason is that I haven't studied hard enough for that course.
5. When I fail to do as well as expected in school, it is often due to a lack of effort on my part.
6. Poor grades inform me that I haven't worked hard enough.

Context

1. Some of the times that I have gotten a good grade in a course, it was due to the teacher's easy grading scheme.
2. Some of my good grades may simply reflect that these were easier courses than most.
3. Sometimes I get good grades only because the course material was easy to learn.
4. In my experience, once a professor gets the idea you're a poor student, your work is much more likely to receive poor grades than if someone else handed it in.

5. Often my poorer grades are obtained in courses that the professor has failed to make interesting.
6. Some low grades I've received seem to me to reflect the fact that some teachers are just stingy with marks.

Luck

1. Sometimes my success on exams depend on some luck.
2. I feel that some of my good grades depend to a considerable extent on chance factors such as having the right questions show up on an exam.
3. Sometimes I feel that I have to consider myself lucky for the good grades I get.
4. Some of my lower grades have seemed to be partially due to bad breaks.
5. My academic low points sometimes make me think I was just unlucky.
6. Some of my bad grades may have been a function of bad luck, being in the wrong course at the wrong time.

Affiliation

Ability

1. It seems to me that getting along with people is a skill.
2. Having good friends is simply a matter of one's social skill.
3. It is impossible for me to maintain close relations with people without my tact and patience.
4. It seems to me that failure to have people like me would show my ignorance in interpersonal relationships.
5. I feel that people who are often lonely are lacking in social competence.
6. In my experience, there is a direct connection between the absence of friendship and being socially inept.

Effort

1. Maintaining friendships requires real effort to make them work.
2. In my case, success at making friends depends on how hard I work at it.
3. If my marriage were to succeed, it would have to be because I worked at it.
4. If I did not get along with others, it would tell me that I hadn't put much effort into the pursuit of social goals.
5. When I hear of a divorce, I suspect that the couple

probably did not try enough to make their marriage work.

6. In my experience, loneliness comes from not trying to be friendly.

Context

1. My enjoyment of a social occasion is almost entirely dependent on the personalities of the other people who are there.
2. Some people can make me have a good time even when I don't feel sociable.
3. To enjoy myself at a party I have to be surrounded by others who know how to have a good time.
4. No matter what I do, some people just don't like me.
5. Some people just seem predisposed to dislike me.
6. It is almost impossible to figure out how I have displeased some people.

Luck

1. Making friends is a funny business; sometimes I have to chalk up my successes to luck.
2. In my experience, making friends is largely a matter of having the right breaks.
3. If my marriage were a long, happy one, I'd say that I must just be very lucky.
4. Often chance events can play a large part in causing rifts between friends.
5. I find that the absence of friendships is often a matter of not being lucky enough to meet the right people.
6. Difficulties with my friends often start with chance remarks.

Self-Monitoring Scale

Please rate each statement below on how characteristic it is of you, using the scale below:

- 1 = The statement is not at all characteristic of me
- 2 = The statement is slightly characteristic of me
- 3 = The statement is moderately characteristic of me
- 4 = The statement is very characteristic of me
- 5 = The statement is extremely characteristic of me

1. I find it hard to imitate the behavior of other people.
2. My behavior is usually an expression of my true inner feelings.
3. At parties and social gatherings, I do not attempt to do or say things that others will like.
4. I can only argue for ideas which I already believe.
5. I can make impromptu speeches even on topics about which I have almost no information.
6. I guess I put on a show to impress or entertain others.
7. When I am uncertain how to act in a social situation, I look to the behavior of others for cues.
8. I would probably make a good actor.
9. I rarely need the advice of my friends to choose movies, books, or music.
10. I sometimes appear to be experiencing deeper emotions than I actually am.
11. I laugh more when I watch a comedy with others than when alone.
12. In a group of people I am rarely the center of attention.
13. In different situations and with different people, I often act like very different persons.
14. I am not particularly good at making other people like me.
15. Even if I am not enjoying myself, I often pretend to be having a good time.
16. I'm not always the person I appear to be.
17. I would not change my opinions (or the way I do things) in order to please someone or win their favor.
18. I have considered being an entertainer.
19. In order to get along and be liked, I tend to be what people expect me to be rather than anything else.
20. I have never been good at games like charades or improvisational acting.
21. I have trouble changing my behavior to suit different people and different situations.
22. At a party I let others keep the jokes and stories going.

- 1 = The statement is not at all characteristic of me
 - 2 = The statement is slightly characteristic of me
 - 3 = The statement is moderately characteristic of me
 - 4 = The statement is very characteristic of me
 - 5 = The statement is extremely characteristic of me
-
- 23. I feel a bit awkward in company and do not show up quite as well as I should.
 - 24. I can look anyone in the eye and tell a lie with a straight face (if for a right end).
 - 25. I may deceive people by being friendly when I really dislike them.

APPENDIX C FRIENDS' QUESTIONNAIRE

Description of Friend Form

Please indicate how characteristic each of the follow trait adjectives is of your **friend** (i.e., the person with whom you came to the study), using the 10-point scale below. Your ratings should reflect how you actually see your **friend**.

	Not at all Characteristic			Somewhat						Extremely Characteristic		
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9		
impressive	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9		
depressed	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9		
considerate	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9		
ethical	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9		
popular	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9		
tender	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9		
responsible	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9		
attractive	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9		
reflective	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9		
stylish	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9		
romantic	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9		
admired	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9		
confident	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9		
rude	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9		
analytical	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9		
lovable	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9		
individualistic	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9		
socially anxious	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9		
imaginative	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9		
intellectual	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9		
funny	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9		
introspective	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9		
tactful	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9		
charming	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9		
Self-critical	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9		
goal-oriented	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9		
skeptical	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9		
influential	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9		
creative	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9		

Not at all Characteristic		Somewhat					Extremely Characteristic				
fashionable	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
self-evaluative	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
theatrical	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
honest	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
envied	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
emotional	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
outgoing	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
respectable	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
hopeful	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
diplomatic	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
dreamer	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
sociable	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
stable	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	

Male Friend Ratings of Subject

Please read each item carefully and decide the degree to which the statement is characteristic or true of **your friend**. Then bubble in a number between "1" and "5" on the correct line of the scan-tron form. Please use the scale below.

- 1 = Not at all characteristic of my friend
- 2 = Slightly characteristic of my friend
- 3 = Moderately characteristic of my friend
- 4 = Very characteristic of my friend
- 5 = Extremely characteristic of my friend

1. My friend worries about what people will think of him even when he knows it doesn't make any difference.
2. My friend is unconcerned even if he knows people are forming an unfavorable impression of him.
3. My friend is frequently afraid of other people noting his shortcomings.
4. My friend rarely worries about what kind of impression he is making on someone.
5. My friend is afraid that others will not approve of him.
6. My friend is afraid that people will find fault with him.
7. Other people's opinions of my friend do not bother him.
8. When my friend is talking to someone, he worries about what that person may be thinking about him.
9. My friend is usually worried about what kind of impression he makes.
10. If my friend knows someone is judging him, it has little effect on him.
11. Sometimes my friend thinks he is too concerned with what other people think of him.
12. My friend often worries that he will say or do the wrong things.
13. My friend often feels nervous even in casual get-togethers.
14. My friend usually feels uncomfortable when in a group of people he doesn't know.
15. My friend is usually at ease when speaking to a member of the opposite sex.
16. My friend gets nervous when he must talk to a teacher or boss.
17. Parties often make my friend feel anxious and uncomfortable.
18. My friend is probably less shy in social interactions than most people.
19. My friend sometimes feels tense when talking to people of his own sex if he doesn't know them very well.

- 1 = Not at all characteristic of my friend
- 2 = Slightly characteristic of my friend
- 3 = Moderately characteristic of my friend
- 4 = Very characteristic of my friend
- 5 = Extremely characteristic of my friend

- 20. My friend would be nervous if he was being interviewed for a job.
- 21. My friend wishes he had more confidence in social situations.
- 22. My friend seldom feels anxious in social situations.
- 23. In general, my friend is a shy person.
- 24. My friend often feels nervous when talking to an attractive person of the opposite sex.
- 25. My friend often feel nervous when calling someone he doesn't know very well on the telephone.
- 26. My friend gets nervous when he speaks to someone in a position of authority.
- 27. My friend usually feel relaxed around other people, even people who are quite different from him.
- 28. My friend finds it hard to imitate the behavior of others.
- 29. My friend's behavior is usually an expression of his true inner feelings.
- 30. At parties and social gatherings, my friend does not attempt to do or say things that others will like.
- 31. My friend can only argue for ideas which he already believes.
- 32. My friend can make impromptu speeches even on topics about which he has almost no information.
- 33. My friend puts on a show to impress or entertain others.
- 34. When my friend is uncertain how to act in a social situation, he looks to the behavior of others for cues.
- 35. My friend would probably make a good actor.
- 36. My friend rarely needs the advice of his friends to choose movies, books, or music.
- 37. My friend sometimes appears to be experiencing deeper emotions than he actually is.
- 38. My friend laughs more when he watches a comedy with others than when alone.
- 39. In a group of people my friend is rarely the center of attention.
- 40. In different situations and with different people, my friend often acts like a very different persons.
- 41. My friend is not particularly good at making other people like him.
- 42. Even if my friend is not enjoying himself, he often pretends to be having a good time.
- 43. My friend is not always the person he appears to be.

- 1 = Not at all characteristic of my friend
- 2 = Slightly characteristic of my friend
- 3 = Moderately characteristic of my friend
- 4 = Very characteristic of my friend
- 5 = Extremely characteristic of my friend

- 44. My friend would not change his opinions (or the way he does things) in order to please someone or win their favor.
- 45. My friend has considered being an entertainer.
- 46. In order to get along and be liked, my friend tends to be what people expect him to be rather than anything else.
- 47. My friend has never been good at games like charades or improvisational acting.
- 48. My friend has trouble changing his behavior to suit different people and different situations.
- 49. At a party my friend lets others keep the jokes and stories going.
- 50. My friend feels a bit awkward in company and does not show up quite as well as he should.
- 51. My friend can look anyone in the eye and tell a lie with a straight face (if for a right end).
- 52. My friend may deceive people by being friendly when he really dislikes them.

Please read each item carefully and decide the degree to which the statement is characteristic of your friend. Then bubble in a number between "1" and "7" on the correct line of the scan-tron form. Please use the scale below.

Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Agree

- 53. When my friend gets what he wants it's usually because he worked hard for it.
- 54. When my friend makes plans he is almost certain to make them work.
- 55. My friend prefers games involving some luck over games requiring pure skill.
- 56. My friend can learn almost anything if he sets his mind to it.
- 57. My friend's major accomplishments are entirely due to hard work and intelligence.
- 58. My friend usually doesn't make plans because he has a hard time following through on them.
- 59. My friend believes that competition encourages excellence.
- 60. The extent of my friend's personal achievement is often determined by chance.

61. On any sort of exam or competition my friend likes to know how well he does relative to everyone else.
62. Despite my friend's best efforts he has few worthwhile accomplishments.
63. Even when my friend is feeling self-confident about most things, he still seems to lack the ability to control interpersonal situations.
64. My friend has no trouble making and keeping friends.
65. My friend is not good at guiding the course of a conversation with several others.
66. My friend can usually establish a close personal relationship with someone he finds sexually attractive.
67. When being interviewed my friend can usually steer the interviewer toward the topics he wants to talk about and away from those he wishes to avoid.
68. If my friend needs help in carrying out a plan, it's usually difficult for him to get others to help.
69. If there's someone my friend wants to meet, he can usually arrange it.
70. My friend often finds it hard to get his point of view across to others.
71. In attempting to smooth over a disagreement my friend usually makes it worse.
72. My friend finds it easy to play an important part in most group situations.

Female Friend Ratings of Subject

Please read each item carefully and decide the degree to which the statement is characteristic or true of **your friend**. Then bubble in a number between "1" and "5" on the correct line of the scan-tron form. Please use the scale below.

- 1 = Not at all characteristic of my friend
- 2 = Slightly characteristic of my friend
- 3 = Moderately characteristic of my friend
- 4 = Very characteristic of my friend
- 5 = Extremely characteristic of my friend

1. My friend worries about what people will think of her even when she knows it doesn't make any difference.
2. My friend is unconcerned even if she knows people are forming an unfavorable impression of her.
3. My friend is frequently afraid of other people noting her shortcomings.
4. My friend rarely worries about the kind of impression she is making.
5. My friend is afraid that others will not approve of her.
6. My friend is afraid that people will find fault with her.
7. Other people's opinions of my friend do not bother her.
8. When my friend is talking to someone, she worries about what that person may be thinking about her.
9. My friend is usually worried about the impressions she makes.
10. If my friend knows someone is judging her, it has little effect on her.
11. Sometimes my friend thinks she is too concerned with what other people think of her.
12. My friend often worries she'll say or do the wrong things.
13. My friend often feels nervous even in casual get-togethers.
14. My friend usually feels uncomfortable when in a group of people she doesn't know.
15. My friend is usually at ease when speaking to a member of the opposite sex.
16. My friend gets nervous when she must talk to a teacher or boss.
17. Parties often make my friend feel anxious and uncomfortable.
18. My friend is probably less shy in social interactions than most people.
19. My friend sometimes feel tense when talking to people of her own sex if she doesn't know them very well.

- 1 = Not at all characteristic of my friend
 - 2 = Slightly characteristic of my friend
 - 3 = Moderately characteristic of my friend
 - 4 = Very characteristic of my friend
 - 5 = Extremely characteristic of my friend
20. My friend would be nervous if she was being interviewed for a job.
 21. My friend wishes she had more confidence in social situations.
 22. My friend seldom feels anxious in social situations.
 23. In general, my friend is a shy person.
 24. My friend often feels nervous when talking to an attractive person of the opposite sex.
 25. My friend often feel nervous when calling someone she doesn't know very well on the telephone.
 26. My friend gets nervous when she speaks to someone in a position of authority.
 27. My friend usually feel relaxed around other people, even people who are quite different from her.
 28. My friend finds it hard to imitate the behavior of others.
 29. My friend's behavior is usually an expression of her true inner feelings.
 30. At parties and social gatherings, my friend does not attempt to do or say things that others will like.
 31. My friend can only argue for ideas which she already believes.
 32. My friend can make impromptu speeches even on topics about which she has almost no information.
 33. My friend puts on a show to impress or entertain others.
 34. When my friend is uncertain how to act in a social situation, she looks to the behavior of others for cues.
 35. My friend would probably make a good actor.
 36. My friend rarely needs the advice of her friends to choose movies, books, or music.
 37. My friend sometimes appears to be experiencing deeper emotions than she actually is.
 38. My friend laughs more when she watches a comedy with others than when alone.
 39. In a group of people my friend is rarely the center of attention.
 40. In different situations and with different people, my friend often acts like a very different persons.
 41. My friend is not particularly good at making other people like her.
 42. Even if my friend is not enjoying herself, she often pretends to be having a good time.
 43. My friend is not always the person she appears to be.

- 1 = Not at all characteristic of my friend
 - 2 = Slightly characteristic of my friend
 - 3 = Moderately characteristic of my friend
 - 4 = Very characteristic of my friend
 - 5 = Extremely characteristic of my friend
44. My friend would not change her opinions (or the way she does things) in order to please someone or win their favor.
 45. My friend has considered being an entertainer.
 46. In order to get along and be liked, my friend tends to be what people expect her to be rather than anything else.
 47. My friend has never been good at games like charades or improvisational acting.
 48. My friend has trouble changing her behavior to suit different people and different situations.
 49. At a party my friend lets others keep the jokes and stories going.
 50. My friend feels a bit awkward in company and does not show up quite as well as she should.
 51. My friend can look anyone in the eye and tell a lie with a straight face (if for a right end).
 52. My friend may deceive people by being friendly when she really dislikes them.

Please read each item carefully and decide the degree to which the statement is characteristic or true of **your friend**. Then bubble in a number between "1" and "7" on the correct line of the scan-tron form. Please use the scale below.

Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Agree

53. When my friend gets what she wants it's usually because she worked hard for it.
54. When my friend makes plans she is almost certain to make them work.
55. My friend prefers games involving some luck over games requiring pure skill.
56. My friend can learn almost anything if she sets her mind to it.
57. My friend's major accomplishments are entirely due to hard work and intelligence.
58. My friend usually doesn't make plans because she has a hard time following through on them.
59. My friend believes that competition encourages excellence.
60. The extent of my friend's personal achievement is often determined by chance.

61. On any sort of exam or competition my friend likes to know how well she does relative to everyone else.
62. Despite my friend's best efforts she has few worthwhile accomplishments.
63. Even when my friend is feeling self-confident about most things, she still seems to lack the ability to control interpersonal situations.
64. My friend has no trouble making and keeping friends.
65. My friend is not good at guiding the course of a conversation with several others.
66. My friend can usually establish a close personal relationship with someone she finds sexually attractive.
67. When being interviewed my friend can usually steer the interviewer toward the topics she wants to talk about and away from those she wishes to avoid.
68. If my friend needs help in carrying out a plan, it's usually difficult for her to get others to help.
69. If there's someone my friend wants to meet, she can usually arrange it.
70. My friend often finds it hard to get her point of view across to others.
71. In attempting to smooth over a disagreement my friend usually makes it worse.
72. My friend finds it easy to play an important part in most group situations.

Self-Consciousness Scale

Finally, please answer the following questions. Indicate how characteristic each statement is of YOU by using the following scale:

- 1 = extremely uncharacteristic
- 2 = uncharacteristic
- 3 = neutral
- 4 = characteristic
- 5 = extremely characteristic

- 73. I'm always trying to figure myself out.
- 74. I'm concerned about my style of doing things.
- 75. Generally, I'm not very aware of myself.
- 76. I reflect about myself a lot.
- 77. I'm very concerned about the way I present myself.
- 78. I'm often the subject of my own fantasies.
- 79. I never think of why I do what I do.
- 80. I'm very self-conscious about the way I look.
- 81. I'm generally attentive to my inner feelings.
- 82. I usually worry about making a good impression.
- 83. I'm constantly examining my motives.
- 84. One of the last things I do when I leave the house is look in the mirror.
- 85. I sometimes have the feeling I'm off somewhere watching myself.
- 86. I'm concerned about what other people think of me.
- 87. I'm alert to changes in my mood.
- 88. I'm usually aware of my appearance.
- 89. I'm aware of the way my mind works when I work through a problem.

APPENDIX D DEBRIEFING FORM

Do you have any questions about the experimental packet? I'd like to describe the nature of the study in more detail. One goal of this study is to examine the factors that are related to self-consciousness - the extent to which people focus on the public and private aspects of themselves.

Current research on the self suggests that one's self-concept may include multiple contexts. That is, individuals may focus on their "actual selves" (what they think they are actually like), their "desired selves" (what they think they can and should be like), or their "perceived selves" (how they think they are viewed by others). The present study hopes to examine how discrepancies in these various selves relate to self-consciousness. This study is also interested in examining the relationship between self-consciousness and self-presentation confidence, and abilities.

By examining people's responses to the items in the personality scales with their responses to the self-concept measures, we can explore how differences in self-concept relate to various factors. In addition, by asking friends to participate and provide descriptions about the subjects of this study, we are able to examine whether subjects are accurate in their beliefs about how close others view them.

Do you have any questions about the nature of the study at this time? If, in the future, you have any questions about this study, please feel free to contact John Pennington (392-2732) or Barry Schlenker (392-0526). Finally, by initializing this debriefing sheet, you are indicating that you have been informed of the nature of the study and your participation in it, and agree to allow us to use your data in our analyses. Thank you for your participation.

APPENDIX E
TRAIT ADJECTIVE RATING FORM

Characteristics of Identity

Our "**identity**" defines who we are and what we are like. That is, it represents the type of person that we are. Our identity is made up of our characteristics (ex., age, gender, personality traits), roles (ex., student, employee), and convictions (ex. values, beliefs).

Further, our identity may be divided into at least 2 types - a **social** identity and a **personal** identity. Our social identity reflects the various roles that we occupy, as well as our reputation, status, and membership in groups or organizations. Those who strongly value their social identity would say that their popularity with other people, their physical appearance, and the way they come across to others are all important to their sense of who they are.

Alternatively, our personal identity reflects our own private views and opinions of ourselves, and includes those traits, abilities, and characteristics that set us apart from others. Those who strongly value their personal identity would say their personal values, goals, thoughts, feelings, and beliefs are all important to their sense of who they are.

The investigators of this study are interested in identifying trait adjectives that may be seen as relevant to a person's social and personal identity. To this end, we would like you to read a list of trait adjectives and rate each according to how relevant it would be to a person's social and personal identity, using the top scale. Finally, rate how positive each of the trait adjectives is using the bottom scale.

Not at all Relevant 1	Slightly Relevant 2	Moderately Relevant 3	Very Relevant 4	Extremely Relevant 5
Extremely Negative 1	Somewhat Negative 2	Neutral 3	Somewhat Positive 4	Extremely Positive 5

	Social Identity	Personal Identity	Positivity
1. outdated	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
2. honest	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
3. moody	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
4. bizarre	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
5. selfaware	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
6. sexy	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
7. hip	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
8. envied	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
9. vain	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
10. distrustful	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
11. reflective	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
12. tactful	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
13. faddish	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
14. inquisitive	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
15. friendly	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
16. genuine	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
17. unique	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
18. persuasive	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
19. cultured	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
20. desirable	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
21. superficial	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
22. appealing	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
23. dynamic	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
24. overeager	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
25. athletic	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
26. expressive	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
27. needy	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
28. submissive	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
29. provocative	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
30. uncivil	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
31. unfair	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
32. enthusiastic	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
33. steadfast	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
34. polite	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
35. impressive	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
36. shrewd	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
37. creative	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
38. detached	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
39. whimsical	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
40. foolish	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
41. unpopular	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
42. outcast	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
43. considerate	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
44. pompous	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
45. popular	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
46. introspective	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
47. compulsive	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
48. cowardly	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
49. uncompromising	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5

	Social Identity	Personal Identity	Positivity
50. demanding	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
51. sociable	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
52. romantic	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
53. weird	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
54. snobbish	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
55. opinionated	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
56. petty	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
57. obedient	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
58. ambivalent	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
59. dogmatic	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
60. nerdy	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
61. aggressive	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
62. prudish	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
63. beautiful	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
64. alienated	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
65. rude	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
66. immoral	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
67. caring	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
68. worldly	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
69. unsociable	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
70. diplomatic	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
71. ineffective	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
72. misjudged	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
73. funny	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
74. showy	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
75. serious	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
76. thoughtful	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
77. individualistic	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
78. stable	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
79. high-strung	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
80. imaginative	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
81. logical	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
82. biased	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
83. self-evaluative	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
84. aloof	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
85. attractive	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
86. good sport	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
87. preoccupied	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
88. flighty	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
89. self-righteous	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
90. naive	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
91. self-critical	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
92. cooperative	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
93. well spoken	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
94. leader	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
95. responsible	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
96. authentic	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
97. respectable	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
98. contemplative	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5

	Social Identity	Personal Identity	Positivity
99. powerful	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
100. courageous	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
101. philosophical	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
102. moral	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
103. studious	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
104. analytical	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
105. ignorant	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
106. outgoing	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
107. rebellious	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
108. spiritual	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
109. domineering	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
110. shy	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
111. approval-seeking	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
112. silly	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
113. rational	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
114. controversial	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
115. stylish	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
116. real	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
117. trendy	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
118. prejudiced	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
119. awkward	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
120. worrier	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
121. hopeful	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
122. liberal	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
123. reserved	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
124. boring	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
125. intelligent	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
126. principled	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
127. motivated	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
128. insightful	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
129. mature	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
130. dominant	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
131. skilled	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
132. emotional	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
133. quirky	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
134. influential	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
135. ethical	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
136. driven	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
137. selfish	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
138. bold	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
139. boastful	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
140. temperamental	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
141. conservative	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
142. unskilled	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
143. confident	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
144. lovable	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
145. stubborn	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
146. impractical	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
147. stingy	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5

	Social Identity	Personal Identity	Positivity
148. conforming	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
149. incompetent	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
150. intuitive	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
151. charming	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
152. moralistic	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
153. distinctive	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
154. irritating	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
155. sensitive	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
156. theatrical	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
157. pushy	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
158. industrious	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
159. shallow	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
160. fanatic	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
161. childish	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
162. self-controlled	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
163. artistic	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
164. intellectual	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
165. lofty	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
166. calculating	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
167. meditative	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
168. skeptical	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
169. materialistic	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
170. admired	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
171. cynical	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
172. tender	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
173. socially anxious	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
174. passive	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
175. pretentious	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
176. undesirable	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
177. depressed	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
178. idealistic	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
179. different	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
180. goal-oriented	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
181. fake	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
182. promiscuous	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
183. humble	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
184. ambitious	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
185. strange	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
186. dreamer	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
187. short-tempered	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
188. emotionally unstable	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
189. repulsive	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
190. wise	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
191. critical	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
192. impolite	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
193. clever	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5

	Social Identity					Personal Identity					Positivity				
194. effective	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5
195. secure	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5
196. stilted	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5
197. modest	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5
198. fashionable	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5
199. sophisticated	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5
200. judgmental	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5

APPENDIX F
IDENTITY AND POSITIVITY RATINGS OF
TRAIT ADJECTIVES PRESENTED IN PILOT TESTING

Data Based Trait Adjectives

	<u>Social Id</u>	<u>Personal Id</u>	<u>Positivity</u>
Social Identity			
rude	3.3	2.5	1.5 -
impressive	4.2	3.3	4.1 +
popular	4.1	3.5	3.8 +
attractive	4.2	3.6	4.2 +
stylish	3.9	2.9	3.6 +
fashionable	4.0	3.0	3.5 +
socially anxious	3.6	2.9	2.6 -
funny	4.2	3.6	4.3 +
charming	4.2	3.4	4.3 +
influential	4.0	3.2	3.9 +
envied	3.5	2.9	3.0 =
outgoing	4.2	3.6	4.1 +
diplomatic	3.6	3.1	3.7 +
<u>M</u>	3.9	3.2	3.6
Personal			
depressed	3.0	3.7	1.5 -
tender	3.4	4.1	4.1 +
reflective	3.1	4.0	3.8 +
romantic	3.5	4.1	4.2 +
analytical	2.8	3.7	3.6 +
introspective	2.7	3.6	3.5 +
self-critical	3.0	4.1	2.5 -
imaginative	3.3	4.0	4.4 +
creative	3.5	4.2	4.5 +
self-evaluative	2.8	4.2	3.7 +
emotional	3.2	4.0	3.1 +
hopeful	3.4	4.0	4.1 +
dreamer	3.1	3.6	3.6 +
<u>M</u>	3.1	3.9	3.6

	<u>Social Id</u>	<u>Personal Id</u>	<u>Positivity</u>
High on both			
considerate	4.1	4.0	4.6 +
responsible	4.3	4.4	4.7 +
respectable	4.4	4.3	4.6 +
confident	4.1	4.2	4.6 +
lovable	4.2	4.1	4.6 +
intellectual	4.1	4.2	4.5 +
honest	4.2	4.6	4.8 +
goal-oriented	3.9	4.3	4.5 +
<u>M</u>	4.2	4.2	4.6 +

A Priori Based Trait Adjectives

Social			
admired	4.3	3.7	4.3 +
tactful	4.0	3.6	4.1 +
theatrical	3.1	2.6	2.9 -
sociable	4.4	3.7	4.2 +

<u>M</u>	3.95	3.4	3.88
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Personal			
ethical	3.6	4.0	4.3 +
individualistic	3.8	4.2	4.1 +
skeptical	3.1	3.5	2.7 -
stable	3.7	4.1	4.4 +

<u>M</u>	3.55	3.95	3.88
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APPENDIX G
SUBJECTS' 3 SELF RATINGS

Table 5. Subjects' "actual self" ratings as a function of public and private self-consciousness.

	Public Self-Consciousness			
	High		Low	
	Private Self-Consciousness		Private Self-Consciousness	
	High	Low	High	Low
Social Identity				
rude	1.63	3.00	2.37	3.13
impressive	5.84	5.65	5.53	4.97
popular	5.97	6.09	5.30	4.90
attractive	5.73	5.91	5.15	4.74
stylish	6.78	6.65	5.17	5.29
fashionable	6.94	6.53	4.87	4.97
socially anxious	6.63	5.09	4.23	3.71
funny	6.63	6.94	7.10	6.71
charming	6.13	6.27	5.77	5.74
influential	5.91	5.68	5.24	5.16
envied	4.66	4.53	4.41	3.94
outgoing	6.47	6.62	6.30	6.32
diplomatic	6.66	5.85	5.87	5.39
admired	5.88	6.12	5.50	4.52
tactful	6.35	6.24	5.97	5.29
theatrical	5.06	4.03	5.73	4.26
sociable	7.06	7.26	6.37	6.31
Personal Identity				
depressed	3.81	2.99	3.35	2.87
tender	7.03	6.56	7.09	5.81
reflective	6.73	5.12	6.90	4.83
romantic	7.09	6.65	7.37	5.84
analytical	5.63	4.82	6.58	4.87
introspective	6.57	4.92	7.37	4.74
self-critical	8.16	7.03	6.43	6.06
imaginative	6.66	5.94	7.53	6.61
creative	6.47	5.47	7.23	6.23
self-evaluative	7.44	6.18	7.23	5.26
emotional	7.19	6.53	7.20	5.87
hopeful	7.25	6.62	7.23	6.34

Table 5 Cont. Subjects' "actual self" ratings as a function of public and private self-consciousness.

		Public Self-Consciousness			
		High		Low	
		Private Self-Consciousness		Private Self-Consciousness	
		High	Low	High	Low
Personal Identity					
dreamer	7.63		6.18	7.00	5.86
ethical	6.73		6.58	6.77	6.16
individualistic	7.09		5.65	7.38	7.00
skeptical	5.95		5.86	5.60	5.10
stable	5.88		6.85	6.30	6.26
High on both					
considerate	7.66		7.18	7.40	6.23
responsible	7.59		6.71	7.05	6.43
respectable	7.47		7.03	6.83	6.84
confident	5.28		6.13	6.41	5.90
lovable	6.75		7.18	6.80	6.52
intellectual	7.22		6.44	7.27	6.48
honest	7.82		6.85	7.63	6.90
goal-oriented	7.44		6.53	5.90	5.97

Table 6. Subjects' "desired self" ratings as a function of public and private self-consciousness.

	Public Self-Consciousness			
	High		Low	
	Private Self-Consciousness		Private Self-Consciousness	
	High	Low	High	Low
Social Identity				
rude	1.75	1.77	1.87	1.94
impressive	7.28	7.38	6.97	6.65
popular	7.19	7.23	6.30	6.10
attractive	7.47	7.50	6.70	6.84
stylish	7.50	7.29	6.53	6.03
fashionable	7.50	7.68	6.10	5.52
socially anxious	4.78	4.84	3.45	3.55
funny	7.91	7.72	8.37	7.54
charming	7.59	7.47	7.53	6.74
influential	7.38	7.29	6.80	6.48
envied	5.94	6.94	4.73	4.42
outgoing	8.10	7.88	7.87	7.58
diplomatic	7.25	7.09	7.20	6.35
admired	7.34	7.82	7.00	6.68
tactful	7.10	7.24	7.03	6.23
theatrical	5.66	4.50	6.57	5.10
sociable	7.88	7.82	7.73	7.45
Personal Identity				
depressed	1.59	1.67	1.07	1.74
tender	7.19	6.97	7.40	6.90
reflective	7.03	6.26	7.63	6.13
romantic	7.78	7.52	8.40	6.90
analytical	6.22	5.93	6.48	5.52
introspective	6.25	6.11	7.30	5.91
self-critical	5.59	4.82	4.73	4.65
imaginative	7.72	7.38	8.27	7.00
creative	7.66	7.12	8.11	7.48
self-evaluative	6.00	6.24	6.90	5.10
emotional	6.44	6.25	5.93	5.61
hopeful	7.84	7.21	7.73	6.84
dreamer	7.09	6.12	6.90	5.97
ethical	7.53	7.44	7.53	6.77
individualistic	7.69	6.71	7.96	7.05
skeptical	4.06	5.12	4.73	4.35
stable	7.66	8.00	7.87	7.26

Table 6 Cont. Subjects' "desired self" ratings as a function of public and private self-consciousness.

	Public Self-Consciousness			
	High		Low	
	Private Self-Consciousness		Private Self-Consciousness	
	High	Low	High	Low
High on both				
considerate	8.16	7.68	8.17	7.58
responsible	8.44	8.12	8.57	8.03
respectable	8.19	8.15	7.73	7.87
confident	7.38	7.85	7.83	7.71
lovable	7.97	8.17	8.00	7.03
intellectual	8.25	7.50	8.00	7.97
honest	8.25	8.04	7.90	7.81
goal-oriented	7.97	7.94	7.17	7.26

Table 7. Subjects' "perceived self" ratings as a function of public and private self-consciousness.

	Public Self-Consciousness			
	High		Low	
	Private Self-Consciousness		Private Self-Consciousness	
	High	Low	High	Low
Social Identity				
rude	2.38	3.58	2.87	3.52
impressive	5.94	5.88	5.63	5.10
popular	6.22	6.55	5.90	5.26
attractive	6.19	6.29	5.87	4.87
stylish	7.00	6.32	5.60	5.03
fashionable	6.69	6.53	5.20	4.90
socially anxious	6.28	5.21	3.71	3.81
funny	6.66	7.00	7.27	6.68
charming	5.86	5.91	5.53	5.14
influential	5.78	6.15	5.93	5.19
envied	5.22	5.09	4.67	3.71
outgoing	6.22	7.24	6.53	6.42
diplomatic	6.29	5.76	5.33	5.00
admired	6.22	6.38	5.73	4.73
tactful	6.07	6.21	5.53	5.00
theatrical	4.77	3.94	5.77	4.39
sociable	6.99	7.47	6.67	6.35
Personal Identity				
depressed	3.53	2.79	2.53	2.13
tender	6.50	5.74	5.78	4.90
reflective	6.64	5.15	6.46	5.03
romantic	6.81	5.74	6.17	4.71
analytical	5.59	4.76	5.93	4.58
introspective	6.22	5.09	6.70	4.81
self-critical	7.53	5.91	6.23	4.69
imaginative	6.66	5.55	6.93	5.87
creative	6.31	5.62	6.93	6.16
self-evaluative	7.16	5.47	6.63	4.82
emotional	6.53	5.82	6.67	5.26
hopeful	7.19	6.56	6.80	6.10
dreamer	7.03	5.76	6.27	5.32
ethical	6.48	5.82	6.77	5.90
individualistic	6.66	5.90	7.27	6.68
skeptical	6.04	5.53	5.93	4.94
stable	5.87	7.03	6.33	6.48

Table 7 Cont. Subjects' "perceived self" ratings as a function of public and private self-consciousness.

	Public Self-Consciousness			
	High		Low	
	Private Self-Consciousness		Private Self-Consciousness	
	High	Low	High	Low
High on both				
considerate	6.97	6.59	6.60	6.10
responsible	7.31	6.56	6.83	6.23
respectable	7.31	7.30	7.13	6.84
confident	5.41	7.18	6.70	5.54
lovable	6.83	6.40	6.30	6.58
intellectual	7.41	6.61	7.10	6.42
honest	7.33	7.38	7.73	6.48
goal-oriented	7.31	6.41	6.07	5.84

Table 8. Friends' description of subjects as a function of public and private self-consciousness.

	Public Self-Consciousness			
	High		Low	
	Private Self-Consciousness		Private Self-Consciousness	
	High	Low	High	Low
Social Identity				
rude	1.84	2.85	1.83	2.58
impressive	6.44	5.62	5.93	6.03
popular	6.47	6.29	5.66	6.65
attractive	6.59	6.23	5.99	6.29
stylish	7.41	6.24	5.30	5.97
fashionable	7.28	6.18	5.03	6.06
socially anxious	5.25	5.15	3.90	4.16
funny	7.06	6.44	6.63	7.10
charming	6.45	5.44	5.27	5.97
influential	5.97	5.59	4.98	5.97
envied	6.07	5.24	4.48	4.54
outgoing	7.21	7.13	6.50	6.87
diplomatic	6.51	5.87	6.27	5.81
admired	6.43	5.59	5.83	6.10
tactful	6.44	5.59	5.78	5.84
theatrical	5.97	4.68	5.27	5.26
sociable	7.56	7.29	6.70	6.94
Personal Identity				
depressed	3.00	2.37	2.16	1.90
tender	6.49	5.11	5.40	5.68
reflective	6.62	5.32	6.53	5.87
romantic	6.35	4.97	5.70	5.48
analytical	5.53	4.79	5.37	5.19
introspective	6.36	5.26	5.99	5.93
self-critical	6.66	5.29	4.33	5.05
imaginative	6.59	5.68	6.77	6.58
creative	6.41	5.27	6.52	6.58
self-evaluative	7.03	5.26	6.17	5.81
emotional	6.63	5.56	5.80	5.81
hopeful	6.84	6.43	6.50	6.26
dreamer	6.04	5.25	5.80	5.39
ethical	6.77	5.38	6.43	6.84
individualistic	6.81	6.17	6.97	7.33
skeptical	5.75	4.50	4.37	5.19
stable	6.44	6.09	7.23	6.65

Table 8 Cont. Friends' description of subjects as a function of public and private self-consciousness.

	Public Self-Consciousness			
	High		Low	
	Private Self-Consciousness		Private Self-Consciousness	
	High	Low	High	Low
High on both				
considerate	7.16	6.41	6.23	6.87
responsible	7.16	6.56	7.33	6.77
respectable	7.85	7.32	6.93	7.06
confident	5.72	6.12	6.67	7.03
lovable	6.78	5.94	5.83	6.55
intellectual	7.38	6.65	7.17	6.48
honest	7.97	7.03	7.80	7.32
goal-oriented	7.28	6.53	6.76	5.94

APPENDIX H
ATTRIBUTION AND ADDITIONAL DATA

Table 9. Academic and affiliative outcome attributions as a function of public and private self-consciousness.

	Public Self-Consciousness			
	High		Low	
	Private Self-Consciousness		Private Self-Consciousness	
	High	Low	High	Low
Academic Success				
Ability	5.41	5.04	5.33	4.68
Effort	5.48	5.05	5.38	4.65
Context	4.71	4.67	4.34	4.20
Luck	4.17	4.25	3.46	4.24
Academic Failure				
Ability	4.15	3.75	3.33	3.38
Effort	5.67	5.45	5.57	5.33
Context	4.45	4.72	4.18	4.07
Luck	3.73	3.75	3.51	3.55
Affiliative Success				
Ability	4.36	4.20	3.93	3.40
Effort	5.06	4.75	4.54	4.24
Context	5.52	4.96	4.80	4.17
Luck	3.45	3.41	2.94	2.99
Affiliative Failure				
Ability	4.21	4.11	3.54	3.58
Effort	3.77	3.89	3.36	3.52
Context	4.26	3.65	3.82	3.46
Luck	4.23	3.97	3.69	3.53

Table 10. Additional dependent measures means as a function of public and private self-consciousness.

	Public Self-Consciousness			
	High		Low	
	Private Self-Consciousness		Private Self-Consciousness	
	High	Low	High	Low
S.P. Skill				
1. Social				
Stage Pres.	2.82	2.84	3.14	2.94
2. Interpersonal				
Control	4.77	4.88	5.09	4.88
Subj-Friend Discrepancy				
Self-Presentation Skill				
3. Emot. Control	1.36	1.34	1.26	1.28
4. Interp. Control	1.62	1.63	1.56	1.58
5. Pers. Efficacy	1.58	1.62	1.51	1.57
Identity				
6. Actual-overall	1.84	1.99	2.02	2.04
7. Actual-social	1.97	1.95	1.96	2.06
8. Actual-personal	1.91	2.16	2.21	2.08
9. Actual-soc/per	1.73	1.70	1.76	1.82
10. Perceived-soc	2.00	2.11	2.09	2.10
Friends' SC score by Subjects' SC Group				
11. Private Sc	3.64	3.66	3.65	3.75

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
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
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
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